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The Future of Music in a Digital Age:
The Ongoing Conflict Between Copyright Law
and Peer-to-Peer Technology
LORI

A.

MOREA*

INTRODUCTION

In today's technology-driven environment, information is constantly at our fingertips. Although computer-based technology simplifies many everyday activities, the technology also unfortunately makes
it convenient and simple to violate United States copyright laws. Each
and every day, substantial numbers of people, specifically college students, download copyright-protected music over peer-to-peer networks,
which violates the rights of artists who legally maintain control over
the reproduction and distribution of their creations. Copyright
infringement hurts artists financially, and it also discourages further
creativity and innovation. On the other hand, consumers contend that
they have been pushed towards illegal behavior because it is convenient and the cost of buying authorized copies of CDs is unreasonably
high and continues to increase.
This article explains the issues that have surfaced as a result of the
development of new technology and peer-to-peer networks, as well as
civil lawsuits the recording industry has pursued against infringers. In
light of the limited effectiveness of the recording industry's current litigation campaign against end-users, this article describes the potential
for enhanced criminal penalties to deter copyright infringement
through peer-to-peer networks, as well as other means of solving the
problems facing the recording industry. Specifically, Part I of this article addresses how copyright law has been violated in terms of peer-topeer technology. Part II explains the response of the recording industry and how its strategy of fighting music piracy has evolved from
attacks against peer-to-peer services, such as Napster and Grokster, to
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attacks against individual copyright infringers. It also discusses the
limited effectiveness and probable failure of this strategy. Part III of
this article discusses the criminal penalties currently available under
the Copyright Act and how they have evolved throughout the past one
hundred years, as well as a selection of key court decisions that have
involved the criminalization of copyright infringement. Suggested legislation, The Piracy Deterrence and Education Act of 2004, is analyzed
fully, and it is determined that judging many young Americans to be
criminals for sharing files over peer-to-peer networks ultimately will
not successfully compensate copyright holders. Part IV of this article
explains why peer-to-peer technology should be embraced by
lawmakers, and finally Part V concludes that other legitimate alternatives, such as a noncommercial use levy or a government-run rewards
system, should be considered and accepted as the best solutions to
curb the problems of music piracy in today's digital environment.
Under a new copyright regime, artists could have the opportunity to be
compensated for their work and creativity and innovation could flourish over peer-to-peer networks.
I.

COPYRIGHT LAW AND PEER-TO-PEER NETWORKS

Violations of copyright law harm those who invest their hard
work and dedication into creating original works. As a result, the government has taken steps to protect copyright holders, amending copyright law to reflect the constant introduction of new technology into
the marketplace. The government has tried continuously to provide
such protection of innovative works in order to respect the intentions
of the Constitution, which states that, "the Congress shall have Power
...to promote the Progress of Science and useful arts.., by securing
for limited times to authors ... the exclusive right to their ... writings
and discoveries ....,1 This clause encourages Congress to provide
incentives for continuous creativity and innovation, which includes
music and sound recordings, among many other categories. The laws
created by Congress in relation to the rights of artists and innovators
are violated when individuals take it upon themselves to decide that
music should be free to the public, and act on this belief by disseminating the material to others through the assistance of the Internet and
file-sharing networks.
With the introduction of the Internet and the increased availability of computers, new technology constantly is introduced to society.
One extraordinarily influential technological advance has been the
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 8.
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MPEG-1 Audio Layer 3 (more commonly referred to as an MP3). This
technology makes it possible to compress large amounts of audio
material into small files that can quickly and easily be transferred over
the Internet. The most positive aspect of these files is that they retain
high-quality sound, which attracts consumers to downloading MP3s
onto their own personal computers. 2 As a result of this new technology, companies such as Napster, Kazaa, and Grokster began distributing free software that enabled users to illegally share files, specifically
copyrighted music files, in the compressed format of an MP3.
Although many of these peer-to-peer networks may be operated in fully
legal ways through the distribution of authorized recordings at a low
cost or by those participating in fair use activities, they have also been
used as a means of mass piracy of copyrighted works. In such cases,
individuals are utilizing the Internet to strip copyright holders of their
legally protected rights to control the distribution of and the manner in
which their creative works are communicated.
II.

THE RESPONSE OF THE RECORDING INDUSTRY

One of the most visible organizations in the fight against music
piracy has been the Recording Industry Association of America
(RIAA). The RIAA is a not-for-profit trade association consisting of
record companies and members of the music industry that, as a whole,
create, manufacture, and distribute over ninety percent of the lawful
sound recordings sold in the United States. They have expressed their
mission as one that protects the intellectual property rights of artists,
and as such, they have been leaders in the battle to prevent illegal filesharing.4 According to the RIAA, the illegal distribution of music costs
the industry in excess of 300 million dollars per year in the United
States alone.' Clearly, this is economically harmful to the country, as
well as to artists and record companies that have faced serious declines
in sales and lost profits. In response, the RIAA has implemented a
series of strategies to fight the piracy of their artistic creations.
2. See Wendy Pollack, Tuning In: The Future of Copyright Protection for Online
Music in the Digital Millennium, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 2445, 2447 (2000).
3. See Zeb G. Schorr, The Future of Online Music: Balancing the Interests of Labels,
Artists, and the Public, 3 VA. SPORTS & ENT. LJ. 67, 68 (2003).
4. See Recording Industry Association of America, About Us, http://
www.riaa.com/about/default.asp (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
5. See Recording Industry Association of America, http://www.riaa.com/issues/
piracy/default.asp (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
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Contributory Infringement

In the beginning, copyright owners primarily attempted to protect
their interests by suing those who facilitated copyright infringement,
such as Napster. This approach appeared more efficient than attacking individual infringers, which could be time consuming and costly.
There are millions of people participating in unlawful activities over
the Internet, and punishing this group in its entirety would be unreasonable and, as a practical matter, nearly impossible. Additionally,
many of these infringers are young people and college students who
most likely could not pay meaningful amounts in damages to copyright owners.6 The decisions in the cases against those who provided
the means to individuals to violate copyright law were based on theories of secondary and contributory liability. An examination of some
court decisions brought by members of the recording industry against
file-sharing networks helps illustrate the futility of this strategy.
7
1) A&M Records v. Napster, Inc.

Between the years of 1999 and 2001, Napster, Inc. distributed
software that enabled individuals to connect directly to the computers
of others to exchange music files. A user could connect to the Napster
website and download MusicShare software. All music files situated
on the user's personal computer would then be incorporated into a
catalog, which was available on Napster's central server for all users to
access.' The software permitted the Internet user to search the central
server for any specific song or artist. After searching, a user could
download preferred files, transferring them directly from one user's
computer to another through an Internet connection.9 This system is
an example of a peer-to-peer network, and although capable of legal
uses, in reality users employed the software primarily to commit copyright infringement on a considerable scale.' ° In December 1999, several record companies banded together to sue Napster for the
infringing activities that its software facilitated, and the industry
argued that Napster should be liable for contributory infringement."
6. See Mark A. Lemley & Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement
Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REv. 1345, 1346 (2004).
7. A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
8. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the Emergence of
Cooperation on the File-Swapping Networks, 89 VA. L. REv. 505, 512 (2003).
9. Id. at 513.
10. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1011.
11. Contributory infringement is a form of indirect infringement that requires (1)
knowledge of the infringing activity and (2) a material contribution to the alleged
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In response, Napster countered that it should not be liable since the
network was capable of "substantial non-infringing uses," citing Sony
Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. in support of this proposition.' 2 The Sony court held that if a device is capable of "substantial fully legal applications," the developer or supplier should not be
held liable for the behavior of its customers. 3
The appellate court deciding the Napster case in 2001 was not
persuaded that the case under inspection was analogous to Sony. The
court determined that, in the Internet context, contributory infringement occurs when one who operates a computer system is aware that
infringing files exist on the network and subsequently fails to remove
them. 1 4 According to both the trial and appellate decisions in the Napster case, "sufficient knowledge [existed] to impose contributory liability when linked to demonstrated infringing use of the Napster
system."'1 5 As such, since Napster clearly understood that its system
was being used for illegal purposes and yet failed to stop this activity, it
was liable for the acts of the software's users. 1 6 The Napster case
piracy. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1160
(9th Cir. 2004). It was argued that Napster could be liable for contributory
infringement since it provided the software that allowed users illegally to upload and
download music, and since Napster was a centralized network, the company
reasonably should have known that users were partaking in infringing activities.
Napster, 239 F.3d at 1021.
12. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020 (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984) (holding Sony should not be held responsible for those
who purchased VCRs and utilized them to violate the copyright laws)); see also Lemley
& Reese, supra note 6, at 1355 (explaining the outcome of the Sony case, which held
that the sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of commerce, does
not constitute contributory infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate,
unobjectionable purposes, and that copying equipment need merely be capable of
substantial noninfringing uses).
13. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442. This case is useful in providing protection for creators
of technologies that are related to the use of copyrighted material. When a product is
developed that is capable of both infringing and substantially noninfringing uses, the
Sony doctrine was intended to provide assurance that the technology developer would
not be held liable for those infringements that consumers commit using the new
technology. Id.
14. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020; see also Lemley & Reese, supra note 6, at 1357
(explaining the Ninth Circuit deciding the Napster case read Sony narrowly, and
concluding that making and selling equipment capable of noninfringing use could still
lead to secondary liability for users' infringements if a copyright owner could establish
by other means that the maker knew, or perhaps should have known, of the users'
infringements, and materially contributed to them).
15. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022.
16. Id.
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proved to be a victory for the music industry. After this decision, however, the recording industry still continued to suffer losses. Copyright
infringement through various other peer-to-peer networks continued to
grow and to hurt the music business.
2)

17
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.

In the wake of Napster's development, a wave of other file-sharing
services were introduced. Specifically, Grokster distributed the "Grokster" and "Morpheus" software, which like Napster's MusicShare,
allowed users to swap files located on each user's respective computer
system. Although users still connected directly to each others' computers to exchange files, as users of the Napster software did, a significant difference existed in the fact that the Grokster system did not
maintain any form of centralized index.18 In 2001, the recording
industry again sought to stop file-sharing, and lawsuits were filed
against those responsible for the "Grokster" and "Morpheus" software.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit looked to the
Napster decision, in which it was decided that the network operators
could be held liable for facilitating copyright infringement if (1) they
had actual knowledge of the infringement and (2) they failed to prevent the illegal behavior from taking place through their system.1 9
However, since Grokster operated as a decentralized network and since
it was valuable for non-infringing uses, the defendant was not capable
of removing unlawful material. 20 The Ninth Circuit ruled in 2004 that
Grokster was not liable for copyright infringement."' 2 1 The Grokster
decision seemingly indicated that the new form of peer-to-peer networks would not be easily shut down.
In 2005, though, the case went to the Supreme Court, which
found for the plaintiffs.2 2 The Court agreed the network could be used
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1158.
Id. at 1160-61 (citing Napster, 239 F.3d at 1027).
Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1163.
Id. at 1157; see also Lemley & Reese, supra note 6, at 1365. The authors

explain Grokster did not operate the network over which the users of its software
connected and exchanged files, and as a result of the decentralized nature of the
network, when users searched for files, no information was transmitted to or through
any computers owned or controlled by the software makers. Id. As a result, Grokster
and StreamCast (the company that created the Morpheus file-sharing software) did not

provide active and substantial contribution to end-user infringements in any way that
justified holding the companies liable as contributors to those infringements. Id.
22. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005);
see also JUSTICES SKEPTICAL IN SONG-SWAPPING CASE: JUSTICES ASK IF RESTRICTING FILE-
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for non-infringing purposes, but found Grokster encouraged users to
utilize their network for direct infringement.2 3 It was further noted
that the network advertised itself as a Napster alternative. 2 4 Based on
these specific facts, the Supreme Court ruled against Grokster.25 The
ruling may offer the RIAA a strong tool to shut down file-sharing networks that are being used at consistently increasing rates, but such use
is uncertain, considering the fact-specific nature of the case. Consequently, the remainder of this article will consider other solutions to
the growing problem of music piracy.
B.

The RIAA Pursues Punishment of Individuals

In 1998, the U.S. Congress enacted the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) to prohibit the circumvention of tools that protect
copyrighted works from being reproduced illegally.2 6 The DMCA
included specific "expedited subpoena provisions" that could be used
to quickly obtain the private information of Internet users. 27 Following the statute's enactment, the RIAA took advantage of these provisions in order to track down individuals who were downloading large
quantities of copyrighted music files from the Internet. This marked
the beginning of the RIAA's large scale efforts to hold individual
infringers liable for their actions. The DMCA allowed the RIAA to subpoena, without prior court approval, Internet service providers for the
contact information of individuals stealing large quantities of music.
This fast-track method of obtaining private information concerned the
public, as it lacked judicial oversight. As such, it left individuals open
to false accusations of copyright infringement by the recording industry and many believed that First Amendment and privacy issues arose
from the use of DMCA expedited subpoenas.2 8 The court addressed
CNN, Mar.
29, 2005, http://money.cnn.com/2005/03/29/technology/scotus-filesharing/.
23. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2766-67.
24. Id. at 2767.
25. Id. at 2770.
26. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000 & Supp. 2002). The
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) will be discussed more fully in a later
section of this paper, see infra Part II.C.
27. See Recording Industry Association of America, What the RIAA is Doing About
Piracy, http://www.riaa.com/issues/piracy/riaa.asp (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
28. See id. See generally Trevor A. Dutcher, A Discussion of the Mechanics of the
DMCA Safe Harbors and Subpoena Power, as Applied in RIAA v. Verizon Internet
Services, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 493 (2005) (explaining the
DMCA subpoena powers and issues surrounding the use of these subpoenas).
SHARING COULD STIFLE INNOVATION, YET QUESTION ONLINE DOWNLOADING,
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these issues in RIAA v. Verizon Internet Services, Inc., 29 a case involving Internet service provider (ISP) Verizon Internet Services
("Verizon").30

In 2003, the RIAA served a subpoena pursuant to the DMCA on
Verizon, requesting the name of a Verizon subscriber who supposedly
infringed copyrights relating to 600 different songs in a single day.3 '
Verizon argued the subpoena was not valid, since the company interpreted the language of the statute differently and claimed that a subpoena could not be used to obtain material that was not stored on the
ISP's network. 3 2 Thus, Verizon refused to provide the contact information of the subscriber. 3 3 Verizon also fought the subpoena by raising
constitutional issues and arguing that the DMCA violated the First
Amendment.3 4 The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
agreed with Verizon's interpretation, and as a result, the court decided
in 2003 that the tactics used by the RIAA did not embody the intentions of Congress underlying the enactment of the DMCA and that the
subpoenas were not authorized by the law. 35 As a result of this decision, the recording industry was forced once again to develop a new
strategy for protecting their financial interests and for punishing copyright infringers.
C.

Attacking "JohnDoe"

Due in part to the millions of unauthorized downloads each year,
the recording industry's sales have declined dramatically. Despite the
various approaches the industry has taken to fight piracy, sales
declined at higher rates than ever before, up to eleven percent in 2003
from less than seven percent in 2000.36 In response to these increas29. 240 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2003).
30. An Internet Service Provider (ISP) may be defined as a company that provides
access to the Internet. The ISP gives a software package, a username, a password, and
an access phone number for a monthly fee. Using a modem, an individual can log on
to the Internet and browse the World Wide Web. ISPs serve individuals and large
companies, and various ISPs are connected to each other through Network Access
Points (NAPs). Webopedia, Definition of an ISP, http://webopedia.com/TERM/I/
ISP.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2006).
31. Verizon, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 28.
32. Id. at 29.
33. Id. at 28.
34. Id. at 42.
35. Id. at 33-34; see also Alice Kao, RIAA v. Verizon: Applying the Subpoena
Provision of the DMCA, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 405, 406 (2004). See generally RIAA v.
Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
36. Sony Music Entm't, Inc. v. Does 1-40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2004),
Declaration of Christopher Jensen in Support of Plaintiff.
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ing losses, copyright holders next turned to "John Doe"'3 7 lawsuits, in
which the RIAA sued hundreds of individuals, each of whom is identified only by an IP address. 38 After filing these suits against anonymous wrongdoers, Rule 45 subpoenas can then be issued to obtain the
names of the defendants.
This strategy provides more protection for the Internet user's privacy rights as compared to subpoenas issued under the provisions of
the DMCA. Because Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 requires a
plaintiff to file a complaint in court prior to requesting information
from an ISP, this process decreases the probability that innocent people will be accused of copyright infringement, since it is more involved
and allows for additional judicial oversight. Prior to using Rule 45
subpoenas, the recording industry had made significant mistakes in
identifying infringers. For example, the RIAA accused a sixty-six-yearold grandmother of illegally sharing over two thousand copyright-protected music files over the Internet. 3 9 However, the woman did not
even own a computer capable of downloading music. 40 Although mis-

takes are still possible with Rule 45 subpoenas, the approach employed
in the "Doe" cases protects individuals' constitutional rights by raising
the standards applied for proving the guilt of copyright infringers. 4 1
While these recent "Doe" cases are more respectful of an individual's constitutional rights, they have proven to be extremely costly and
time-consuming. In order to reach any significant level of deterrence,
the RIAA must file thousands of "John Doe" lawsuits, which it has
done.42 Some of these, such as the Sony Music Entertainment, Inc. v.
37. "John Doe" is a fictitious name used for an unknown party to a legal
proceeding, to designate a person whose identity is unknown, to protect a person's
known identity, or to indicate that a true defendant does not exist. BLACK's LAW
DICTIONARY

840 (7th ed. 1999).

38. An IP address may be defined as an identifier for a computer. The format of an
IP address is a 32-bit numeric address written as four numbers separated by periods.
Networks using the TCP/IP protocol (the suite of communications protocols used to
connect hosts on the Internet) route messages based on these addresses, and a virtual

connection is established between a destination and a source. Every computer
requires an IP address to connect to the Internet. In the context of the lawsuits being
discussed, these addresses may be used to identify the specific computers being used
to commit copyright infringement. Webopedia, Definition of IP Address, http://
webopedia.com/TERM/I/IPaddress.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2006).
39. Andrew Sparkler, Senators, Congressmen, Please Heed the Call: Ensuring the
Advancement of Digital Technology Through the Twenty-First Century, 14 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1137, 1137 (2004).
40. Id.

41. Sonia K. Katyal, The New Surveillance, 54
42. Id. at 298 n.6.

CASE

W. RES. L. REv. 297, 369 (2003).
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Does 1-40, have been successful.4 3 Numerous other "Doe" cases are
still pending. The filing of these cases followed an announcement in
July 2003 in which the RIAA suggested its members would pursue
individuals employing file-sharing software to steal copyright-protected music. 44 Several of the RIAA's suits against individuals have
been successful, including a case resolved in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in October 2004. This
decision allowed Elektra Entertainment to obtain the identity of six
University of Pennsylvania students alleged to have engaged in unlawful file-sharing.4 5 Overall, the RIAA is continuing to actively pursue
the "Doe" lawsuits. 4 6
A better understanding of this strategy may be obtained by
reviewing
the facts of a recently decided "Doe" case, Sony v. Does 14 7
40.

1) Sony v. Does 1-40
In Sony v. Does 1-40, the plaintiffs, seventeen record companies,
sued forty anonymous individuals who allegedly illegally downloaded
and circulated copyright-protected songs using peer-to-peer file sharing networks.48 In order to uncover these violations, the RIAA
downloaded the files being offered on various peer-to-peer networks,
specifically on the "FastTrack" network.4 9 They later confirmed that
the samples were works copyrighted by RIAA members. 50 The RIAA
noted the time and date at which the downloading took place, as well
as the IP address assigned to each defendant at that time. Internet
43. Sony Music Entm't, Inc. v. Does 1-40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
44. Barry Willis, Mass Hysteria at RIAA, STEREOPHILE, June 29, 2003, http://
stereophile.com/news/ 11679/.

45. Elektra Entm't Group, Inc. v. Does 1-6, Civ. 04-1241, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22673 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 12, 2004).
46. RIAA Strikes Swappers Again, 9,000 Total Suits,

DIGITAL

Music NEWS, Mar. 2,

2005, http://www.digitalmusicnews.com/yesterday/march2005#030205riaa.
47. Sony Music Entm't, Inc. v. Does 1-40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556, 558 (S.D.N.Y.

2004).
48. Id.
49. Id. The Fast Track network is a peer-to-peer file-sharing network that uses a
two-tier system which allows users to search faster. It utilizes a decentralized base, and
supports not only MP3s but also a variety of other formats, like movies and computer
software applications. Fast Track also differs from Napster by its geographical
location. Since it is located outside of the United States, it is more difficult for the
RIAA to ban it. See Ashish Sharma, The Fast Track Network, PC

QUEST,

Sept. 12, 2002,

http://www.pcquest.com/content/p2p/102091205.asp.
50. Sony Music Entm't, Inc. v. Does 1-40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556, 558 (S.D.N.Y.

2004).
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service providers have authority over the distribution of IP addresses
to their subscribers, and as such, only ISPs can verify which customer
used the address at a specific date and time. 51 Based on the IP
addresses, the RIAA served a subpoena on Cablevision, an Internet
service provider, to uncover the identities of the specific individuals
participating in infringing downloading activities.52 The suits filed
against the anonymous individuals were civil actions that sought monetary damages as relief for the harm inflicted upon the copyright
holders.
On July 26, 2004, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the defendants' motion to quash
the subpoena on Cablevision and required the release of all subpoenaed, private information to the RIAA.53
2)

"John Doe" Cases: A Feasible Solution?

With the ability to subpoena ISPs for information on subscribers,
RIAA members have begun to sue individuals whom they suspect of
stealing music online through the use of peer-to-peer networks. In an
effort to protect itself, the industry has continued a campaign to deter
theft. The attack against individual file-sharers began with an initial
round of 261 lawsuits filed on September 8, 2003. 5 4 Another round of
lawsuits was filed on September 30, 2004 against 762 unnamed individuals accused of copyright infringement. 55 A unique set of copyright infringement lawsuits were filed against 761 individuals on
November 18, 2004 as the RIAA began to focus heavily on music
piracy occurring on college campuses.56 Twenty-five of these actions
were against individuals using university networks at schools such as
American University, Boston University, Emerson College, James
Madison University, and many others.5 7 Since this time, the RIAA
members have not backed down from their campaign to prevent
piracy. Multiple other rounds of lawsuits have been filed, including
51. Id. at 559.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 568.
54. Stan J. Liebowitz, File-Sharing: Creative Destruction or Just Plain Destruction?
23-25 (Ctr. for the Analysis of Prop. Rights, Working Paper No. 04-03, 2004), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=646943.
55. Jacquelyn Garofano, Recording Industry Cracks down on Piracy, THE REBEL YELL,
Oct. 21, 2004, available at http://www.unlvrebelyell.com/article.php?ID=2578.
56. Press Release, Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Illegal File Sharing Targeted in
Wave of New Lawsuits (Nov. 18, 2004), available at http://www.riaa.com/news/
newsletter/1 11804.asp.
57. Id.
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754 claims in December 2004 and another 717 in January 2005.58
The claims brought in January 2005 again confirmed the RIAA's
desire to cut back music piracy on college campuses, as "[t]he number
of university network users targeted in these suits [was] nearly three
times the number sued in recent rounds, signaling a continuing effort
59
to step up anti-piracy enforcement on college campuses.
Overall, "John Doe" lawsuits are being actively pursued, as new
lawsuits are filed regularly. Most of these claims are intended to punish individual file-sharers who have downloaded or shared more than
one thousand copyrighted songs. 60 Many of the targeted file-sharers
seek to settle these cases rather than cope with the enormous statutory
damages that would be awarded under existing copyright law. If a
defendant did not settle and was found liable for copyright infringement, he or she could face the possibility of paying damages of $750
for each pirated copyrighted work.6 1 As a result, statistics show that
most of the lawsuits filed by the RIAA have been settled for an approximate average of $3,000 per claim.6 2 This is positive for RIAA members, since their main goal has been to deter individuals from
participating in file-sharing rather than to receive high monetary
compensation.
Although the RIAA's campaign to deter piracy through litigation
against end-users may seem to have some value at first glance, this
approach has several weaknesses. First, the actions of the recording
industry have caused the estrangement of consumers and music fans
as well as hostile responses by the public. 3 Public backlash can be
explained by the idea that "[sluing your customers is not a winning
business strategy .

.

. [a]nd this sort of strategy does not play well in

58. Press Release, Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., New Round of Lawsuits Against
717 Illegal File Sharers Includes Continued Focus on University Network Users Who
Illegally Download Music (Jan. 24, 2005), available at http://www.riaa.com/news/
newsletter/012405.asp [hereinafter Lawsuits Against 717]; see also Press Release,
Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., RIAA Files New Copyright Infringement Lawsuits
Against 754 Illegal File Sharers (Dec. 16, 2004), available at http://www.riaa.com/
news/newsletter/121604.asp [hereinafter Lawsuits Against 754].
59. Lawsuits Against 717, supra note 58.
60. See J. Cam Barker, Note, Grossly Excessive Penalties in the Battle Against Illegal
File-Sharing: The Troubling Effects of Aggregating Minimum Statutory Damages for
Copyright Infringement, 83 TEX. L. REv. 525, 526 (2004).
61. Id. at 536.
62. Id. at 526 n.8.
63. James Brian Beckham, Can the RIAA Survive Substantial Non-infringing Uses?,
10 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2005).
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the court of public opinion. "64 The recording industry may look to the
past experience of Henry Ford and his battle with the Association of
Licensed Automobile Manufacturers and choose to exercise caution in
proceeding with legal action against its customers. 6 5 The current strategy of the RIAA can be compared to the manner in which the automobile industry attempted to stop the threats of cheaper, mass-produced
automobiles that were first designed by Ford. Henry Ford encouraged
innovation with his new method of producing cars, similar to the innovation encouraged by the development of peer-to-peer networks. In the
case of Ford, the automobile industry sued hundreds of Ford's customers between 1903 and 1911 for purchasing "unlicensed vehicles," in
order to deter them from buying the newly mass-produced cars.6 6
Although the recording industry differs greatly from the automobile
industry, the RIAA can learn a valuable lesson from the long battle
that Ford fought and eventually won. From the story of Henry Ford,
the RIAA can notice that when suing customers, "you will rally ordi67
nary people to your opponents and alienate a generation of buyers.
Members of RIAA may want to rethink their strategy of utilizing "John
Doe" lawsuits, since thus far they have gained only a "raft of bad publicity [and] a reputation for being a bully.

68

Another drawback of the RIAA's strategy is the possibility exists
to wrongly accuse consumers, which then angers the public and does
not effectively deter music piracy. Among the thousands of suits filed,
there have been several inaccurate accusations. Discussion of a few of
these instances may be useful in evaluating the effectiveness of the
RIAA's strategy. To begin with, the RIAA made a claim against a
retired teacher, Sarah Ward, for file-sharing. However, Ward could not
have pirated the songs from Kazaa because she owned only an Apple
computer, which was not compatible with the file-sharing software.6 9
Similarly, the RIAA filed a complaint against an individual named
Ross Plank for copyright infringement. He was accused of using Kazaa
file-sharing software to make hundreds of Latin songs accessible to
others online. This claim fell apart when it was discovered that Plank
did not listen to Latin music nor did he have Kazaa installed on his
64. G. Richard Shell, Suing Your Customers: A Winning Business Strategy?, http://
www.eff.org/share/?f=suing-customers.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2006).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Jefferson Graham, Music Industry Weighs Its Options, USA TODAY, Sept. 29,

2003, at 6D.
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computer when the infringement supposedly occurred.7 ° A more current and outrageous claim was made against an eighty-three-year-old
woman, Gertrude Walton, who was accused of sharing over 700 pop,
rock, and rap songs through a file-sharing network.7 The RIAA was
then surprised to find that not only had Walton passed away months
earlier, but according to family, she had refused to even purchase a
computer, an obvious obstacle to partaking in illegal file-sharing.7 2
These various unfounded complaints demonstrate evident drawbacks
in the RIAA's approach and news of these lawsuits may decrease the
public's sympathy for the recording industry in these cases.
The multitude of civil actions brought against young people has
some deterrent value but the large quantities of lawsuits are also timeconsuming and costly for the industry. It takes a significant amount
of time to pursue each case since the traditional discovery process
rather than expedited subpoenas must be used to identify the defendants. Once this process is finally complete, if enough time has lapsed,
the ISP may no longer be holding information about the accused subscriber. There is only a short window of time during which the ISP
will retain such data and this makes the process of accusing individual
infringers difficult. 7 3 Overall, it is indeed questionable if the lawsuits

filed by the RIAA have been significantly effective in decreasing piracy.
After a great deal of statistical analysis, "[s]ome have argued that there
has been a considerable decline in usage coinciding with the [Doe]
lawsuits, while others have argued that the lawsuits have had virtually
no impact."7 4 Some evidence suggests that the onset of the lawsuits
had caused an initial negative impact on file-sharing but the effectiveness seems to be waning.7 5 Due to the limited effectiveness of the
RIAA's "John Doe" strategy, it is necessary to identify other means of
deterring music piracy online and of encouraging an environment
70. Press Release, Electronic Frontier Foundation, Electronic Frontier Foundation
Defends Alleged Filesharer: Another Error in Record Companies' Legal Crusade (Oct.
14, 2005), available at http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/20031014_efLpr.php.
71. Nate Mook, RIAA Sues Deceased Grandmother,BETA NEWS, Feb. 4, 2005, http://

www.betanews.com/article/RIAA SuesDeceasedGrandmother/ 1107532260.
72. Id.
73. See Rob Kasunic, Solving the P2P Problem: An Innovative Marketplace Solution
(Jan. 2005), http://fairuse.stanford.edu/commentary and-analysis/2004 03_kasunic.

html (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
74. Liebowitz, supra note 54, at 23.
75. Id. at 24. Professor Liebowitz shows that file-sharing declined from the first
half of 2003 until the first half of 2004, which can possibly be attributed to the onset
of the RIAA's first rounds of lawsuits. However, in recent months, the popularity of
file-sharing is again growing. Id.
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where Internet services can succeed without inappropriate use.76
Such services may- include the development of enhanced means of
communication as well as the efficient dissemination of material for
academic, scientific, and social purposes.
III.

CIVIL PENALTIES VERSUS CRIMINAL PENALTIES

Since the various approaches utilizing civil penalties have yet to
deter Internet users from downloading enormous amounts of copyrighted music and participating in a range of infringing activities,
some believe that enhanced criminal penalties are needed to successfully discourage copyright infringement. 77 This stems from the belief
that "[a] civil wrongdoer does not suffer the same condemnation, at
least not to the same degree, as one who is found guilty of a crime. 78
Thus, lawmakers have recently proposed federal legislation amending
the copyright law by increasing the criminal penalties for the piracy of
creative works over peer-to-peer networks and through other electronic
means. 79 To understand the possible effectiveness of enhanced
criminalization of copyright infringement, one must understand the
criminal penalties already in place.
A.

Criminal Copyright Infringement: A Brief History, the Copyright
Act of 1976, and Subsequent Amendments

Criminal penalties have been available as a remedy for copyright
infringement for over one hundred years. Despite this, these penalties
have rarely played any role in the enforcement of the rights of copyright holders, and authorities have hesitated to resort to such
prosecutions.8 0
Prior to 1897, copyright protection was outlined in the first federal copyright act written in 1790.81 At that time, only civil remedies
76. See Press Release, Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Illegal File Sharing Targeted

in Wave of New Lawsuits, supra note 56.
77. Steven Penney, Crime, Copyright & the Digital Age, in WHAT IS A CRIME?
CRIMINAL CONDUCT IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (Law Comm'n of Canada ed., 2004),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=439960.
78. Lydia Pallas Loren, Digitization, Commodification, Criminalization: The
Evolution of Criminal Copyright Infringement and the Importance of the Willfulness
Requirement, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 835, 899 (1999).
79. See, e.g., H.R. 4077, 108th Cong. § 110 (2004). H.R. 4077 is Congressman
Lamar Smith's Piracy Deterrence and Education Act of 2004, which advocates
deterring music piracy through educational efforts and increased criminal penalties
for copyright infringement.
80. Penney, supra note 77, at 3.
81. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1802).
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were available to copyright holders.8 2 In 1897, Congress provided for
criminal penalties for unauthorized interpretations of musical arrangements and performances, making such behavior punishable as a misdemeanor.8 3 In order to warrant this punishment, the infringement
was required to have been "[willful] and for profit," a requirement that
carried forward to the Copyright Act of 190984 and subsequent
revisions.8 5
Since these early criminal provisions for copyright infringement,
only slight changes have been made. The Copyright Act of 1909
expanded the scope of previously established criminal penalties to
include all classifications of unlawful activities, 8 6 rather than solely
"public performances or representations '' 7 or infringement of copyrighted "dramatic or musical compositions."8 8 The most recently
enacted copyright legislation is the Copyright Act of 1976.89 As it
stands today, with some amendments taken into consideration, the
1976 Act describes criminal copyright offenses in § 506. Section
506(a) currently provides that criminal infringement occurs when:
Any person who infringes a copyright willfully either (1) for purposes
of commercial advantage or private financial gain, or (2) by the reproduction or distribution, including by electronic means, during any
180-day period, of 1 or more copies or phonorecords9 ° of 1 or more
copyrighted works, which have a total retail value of more than $1,000,
shall be punished under § 2319 of title 18, United States Code. 9 1
82. Id. at n.3.
83. See Act of Jan. 6, 1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481 (1897).
84. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 33 Stat. 1075 (1909).
85. MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §15.01[A][1]
(Matthew Bender ed., 2005).
86. See Philip Stuller, Comment, How the RIAA Can Stop Worrying and Learn to
Love the RICO Act, 24 Loy. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 521, 523-25 (2004).
87. See Loren, supra note 78, at 840.
88. Id. at 841.
89. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended
at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (2000)).
90. A phonorecord is a term used in legal definitions to refer to physical recordings
of songs, such as vinyl LPs, cassette-tapes, and compact discs or any other material
object in which sounds are fixed by any method now known or later developed, and
from which the sounds can be perceived, reproduced, or communicated, either directly
or with the aid of a machine or device. Musicians' Exchange, Definition of a
Phonorecord, http://musicians.about.com/library/glossary/P/bldef-phonorecord.htm
(last visited Feb. 22, 2006).
91. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2000) (amended 2005). See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2319
(2000 & Supp. 2002) (setting forth punishments for violation of 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)).
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As outlined by the 1976 Act, wrongdoers could be imprisoned for up
to one year and could incur fines of up to $10,000, which would be
increased to $25,000 in relation to sound recordings or motion pictures.9 2 More severe punishments exist for cases of repeat criminal
behavior. 93 In addition, courts must order the "forfeiture and destruction or other disposition of all infringing copies or phonorecords and
all implements, devices, or equipment used in the manufacture of such
infringing copies or phonorecords."9 4
The lack of prosecutions under the criminal provisions of the Act,
combined with the development of new technologies, prompted
amendments to the 1976 Act.9 5 Members of affected industries urged
Congress to increase criminal penalties for copyright infringement and
to classify some significant infringing activities as felonies.9 6 In 1982,
Congress amended the Copyright Act to allow for new maximum fines
as high as $250,000 and possible imprisonment of five years in cases
where the individual was involved in reproducing or distributing more
than 1000 copies of one or more copyrighted sound recordings, or
more than sixty-five copies of one or more motion pictures or audiovisual works. 97 In addition, another category of felonies was established, which allowed for fines of up to $250,000 and a maximum of
two years in prison for the reproduction or distribution of at least 100
copies in the same time period. 98 These penalties were placed in a new
section, § 2319 of the United States Code, while the criminal offenses
were defined in § 506(a) of title 17 (the Copyright Act). 9 9
The Copyright Act of 1976 was further amended in 1992 with the
introduction of the Copyright Felony Act.' 0 0 The 1992 amendments
were intended to impose criminal penalties for copyright violations
related to computer software. The requirements for felony classification for all types of works were decreased to require the creation of
92. 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (2000 & Supp. 2002); see 4 NIMMER, supra note 85 at § 15.01
[BI[l].
93. 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (2000 & Supp. 2002).
94. 17 U.S.C. § 506(b) (2000) (amended 2005); see also 4 NiMMER, supra note 92.
95. ARTHUR R. MILLER & MICHAEL H. DAVIS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS,
TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHT IN A NUTSHELL, 412-13 (3d ed. 2000).
96. Loren, supra note 78, at 843.

97. Act of May 24, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-180, 96 Stat. 91 (1982).
98. Id.
99. See

Federal

Prosecution

of Violations

of Intellectual

Property

Rights:

Copyrights, Trademarks, and Trade Secrets, http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cyber

crime/intell proprts/toc.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2006).
100. Act of Oct. 28, 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-561, 106 Stat. 4233 (1992).
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only ten copies in any 180-day period, as long as the value is deter-

mined to be more than

$2,500.1°1

Following the 1992 amendments, some major issues presented
themselves in relation to criminal copyright law. For example, questions arose regarding the "willfulness" and "for profit" provisions of
the Copyright Act. 10 2 In terms of peer-to-peer technology, it is important to analyze these issues since it is questionable whether the developers and providers of peer-to-peer software are willfully violating the
law. Also, it is unclear whether individuals demonstrate any profit
motives when they participate in file-sharing over peer-to-peer networks. These issues can be better understood by examining two criminal prosecutions under the statute, which clearly discuss issues that
have played a major role in the evolution of criminal copyright law.
1)

United States v. Moran'°3

Copyright law states that for an activity to qualify as infringement, the act must be committed willfully. 1o4 However, the Copyright
statute sets forth no clear definition of willfulness.1 0 5 In 1991, this
issue was addressed by the United States District Court for the District
of Nebraska in United States v. Moran.1°6 Moran was the owner of a
small "mom-and-pop" business that rented movies on videocassette to
customers in Omaha, Nebraska. 10 7 He considered it common practice
to rent out a copy of each tape he purchased, rather than the original
copy, in order to protect the quality and condition of the original videocassette. 10 8 He believed this practice was legal.' 0 9
The federal government filed misdemeanor criminal charges
against Moran, officially accusing him of participating in activities
involving the copying of videocassettes that violated 17 U.S.C.
§ 506(a). 1 10 Moran's defense argued his conduct did not constitute
copyright infringement as defined by law because he lacked the requi101. Id.; see also, 4 NIMMER, supra note 85 and accompanying text.
102. See Act of Oct. 28, 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-561, 106 Stat. 4233 (1992).
103. 757 F. Supp. 1046 (D. Neb. 1991).

104. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2000) (amended 2005).
105. See Stuller, supra note 86, at 533-34.
106. Moran, 757 F. Supp. 1046.
107. Id. at 1047.

108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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This argument addressed the

issue of how "[infringing] a copyright willfully"'112 should be defined.

The court considered that Moran was fully cooperative, always
maintained the original explanation and details of his conduct he provided to the FBI, and did not attempt to rent out both the original work
and the copy for additional profits. 1 3 Moran contended that he
should be found not guilty since he did not demonstrate any willful
intent to violate the copyright laws." 4 Moran truly believed that he
was fully obeying the law, and the court agreed with his view." 5 The
court found Moran not guilty, since under the copyright statute, "the
term 'willful' meant a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal
1 16
duty," which Moran clearly did not demonstrate.
2)

United States v. LaMacchia" 7

In LaMacchia, the court considered the second standard used to
classify an act as criminal infringement." 8 The Copyright Act of 1976
states that criminal infringement exists when "any person... infringes
a copyright ... for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain."" 9 In this case, David LaMacchia, a twenty-one year old student at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, used the university's
computer network to operate an electronic bulletin board. 2 ° His
board, named Cynosure, provided a variety of popular software programs to other individuals. 12 1 Cynosure allowed students to download
copyrighted software programs, and as such, the bulletin board created a means by which wide-scale copyright infringement could be
committed.' 2 2 When the university and law enforcement authorities
discovered his activities, a problem existed due to the fact that
1 23
LaMacchia did not receive payment from any users of Cynosure.
Therefore, his behavior did not fully meet the criteria necessary to
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 1048.
17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2000) (amended 2005).
Moran, 757 F. Supp. at 1051-52.
Id. at 1048.
Id. at 1052.
Id. at 1049 (citations omitted).
871 F. Supp. 535 (D. Mass. 1994).
Id.
17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2000) (amended 2005).
LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. at 536.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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qualify for criminal copyright penalties since he did not operate Cyno124
sure for "commercial advantage or private financial gain.
As a result, the government turned to other legal strategies and
25
prosecuted LaMacchia for wire fraud under the Stolen Property Act.1
He argued that these accusations were inappropriate, and he supported his arguments with a previous Supreme Court decision, Dowling v. United States. 1 26 According to the Dowling decision, "the court,
in an opinion by Justice Blackmun, held that a copyrighted musical
composition impressed on a bootleg phonograph record is not property that is 'stolen, converted, or taken by fraud' within the meaning of
the Stolen Property Act."' 127 Justice Blackmun held in Dowling that
Congress did not intend the penalties developed for wire fraud to be
inflicted on copyright infringers. 1 28 Taking the Dowling decision into
consideration, the district court held LaMacchia could not be prosecuted if his activities were not classified as criminal, as defined by the
Copyright Act.' 2 9 This ruling clearly uncovers a loophole in the Copyright Act, which some may perceive as detrimental. As seen through
the facts of the case, although LaMacchia encouraged significant quantities of infringement and economic damage through the services of
his electronic bulletin board, he never benefited financially from any of
the transactions. 130 As such, the criminal penalties were not applicable
3
in his situation.1 1
B.

The No Electronic Theft Act

In LaMacchia, the court took the opportunity to encourage Congress to update the copyright law, stating:
This [ruling] is not to suggest that there is anything edifying about
what LaMacchia is alleged to have done. .

.

. [Olne might at best

describe his actions as heedlessly irresponsible and at worst as nihilis124. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2000) (amended 2005).
125. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. at 536 (referring to The Stolen Property Act, 18

U.S.C.S. § 2314 (LexisNexis 2006)).
126. See LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. at 537 (citing Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S.
207 (1985)); see also Loren, supra note 78, at 851 (mentioning the Dowling case, in
which Dowling was accused of offenses that stemmed from an extensive bootleg record
operation involving the manufacture and distribution by mail of recordings of Elvis

Presley).
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
TEAM

LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. at 537 (quoting Dowling, 473 U.S. at 216).
Dowling, 473 U.S. at 217-18.
Loren, supra note 78, at 851.
LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. at 537.
U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, No ELECTRONIC THEFT ACT: POLICY DEVELOPMENT
REPORT 2 (1999) [hereinafter Policy Report].
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tic, self-indulgent, and lacking in any fundamental sense of values.
Criminal as well as civil penalties should probably attach to willful,
multiple infringements of copyrighted software even absent a commercial motive on the part of the infringer. One can envision ways that the
copyright law could be modified to permit such prosecution. But, it is
the legislature, not the Court, which is to define a crime, and ordain its
punishment.13 2
In response to both the LaMacchia case and encouragement by the
courts and various industries, Congress enacted the No Electronic
Prior to this legislation, various
Theft Act (NET Act) in 1997.'
amendments had been made to the Copyright Act to increase penalties
for criminal copyright infringement. 1 34 However, piracy through digital technology was still a very visible, growing problem for those who
controlled the rights to reproduce and distribute music, movies, and
computer software.' 3 ' In 1997, there were estimates that the piracy of
intellectual property cost copyright holders more than $11 billion dollars in one year. 136 Additional estimates from 1997 stated that piracy
and theft of copyrighted works over the Internet resulted in 130,000
lost jobs in the United States, as well as significant increases in prices
for honest consumers. 1 3 7 In response, the NET Act demonstrated that
"Congress [intended] to increase the potential criminal liability of
infringers because it [was] the view of Congress that the current standard [failed] to offer an appropriate and effective level of deterrence." 1 38 The basic idea underlying the NET Act was that infringers
who did not act for financial gain should still face severe consequences
for their actions, which would hopefully deter the wrongful behavior of
13 9
individuals such as David LaMacchia.
The NET Act amended the Copyright Act's definition of "commercial advantage or private financial gain" 40 to include "receipt, or
expectation of receipt, of anything of value, including the receipt of
132. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. at 545.
133. No Electronic Theft Act, Pub. L. No. 105-147, 11 Stat. 2678 (1997); see also
Eric Goldman, A Road to No Warez: The No Electronic Theft Act and Criminal Copyright
Infringement, 82 OR. L. REV. 369, 373 (2003).
134. Goldman, supra note 133, at 369; e.g., Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension
Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998).
135. Goldman, supra note 133, at 377-78.
136. See 4 NIMMER, supra note 85.
137. Id.
138. Goldman, supra note 133.
139. Joseph F. Savage, Jr. & Kristina E. Barclay, When The Heartland Is "Outside the
Heartland:"The New Guidelines For NET Act Sentencing, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 373, 383
(2000).
140. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2000) (amended 2005).
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other copyrighted works."1 4 ' This amendment would allow the prosecution of individuals who willfully violated copyright laws without
apparent profit objectives under felony provisions of the Copyright
Act. In addition to closing the loophole identified in LaMacchia, the
NET Act added penalties to apply to the reproduction or distribution of
any copyrighted works within a period of 180 days with a total value of
as little as $1,000.142 Overall, the NET Act was the government's
response to the rapid and easy reproduction and distribution of copyright-protected works through the use of digital technology. The necessity of such efforts was made clear by the limited opposition to the
enactment of the legislation. 143 However, after the fact, some have suggested that the NET Act was an overreaction to the issues, and it unnecessarily enabled the court system to make felons of average American
44

citizens. 1

In addition to concerns that the NET Act was too broad, it did not
provide an immediate solution to the problem, as many copyright owners had hoped. No convictions under the NET Act were pronounced
for the first year and a half following its enactment. 14 5 As these concerns were expressed, the government took action to prosecute several
individuals. 146
The first prosecution under the provisions of the NET Act took
place in August 1999.147 Jeffrey Levy, a twenty-two-year-old student at
the University of Oregon, developed a website that provided a multitude of software, games, and songs which could be downloaded by
third parties. 148 Levy was arrested, pleaded guilty to charges of criminal copyright infringement, and received two years probation. 1 49 This
case demonstrated steps by the government to further deter copyright
infringement on the Internet through increased criminalization of
activities similar to those involved in the case of Jeffrey Levy.' 5 °
New guidelines developed by the U.S. Sentencing Commission to
assist in facilitating prosecutions under the NET Act were not effective,
141. H.R. 2265, 105th Cong. § 2(a) (1997).
142. No Electronic Theft (NET) Act, Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997).
143. Goldman, supra note 133, at 376.
144. E.g., Loren, supra note 78, at 852 (explaining Loren's opinion that the NET Act
was an overreaction to the LaMacchia "loophole").
145. Goldman, supra note 133, at 377.
146. Id. at 378.
147. Id. at 381.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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however, until May 2000.151 This limitation can be further explored
2
through observing the court's decision in United States v. Rothberg.'1
Rothberg pleaded guilty to conspiring with a piracy group by the name
of "Pirates with Attitude," which made a considerable quantity of copyrighted software available to the public for free. 15 3 Rothberg was sentenced to twenty-four to thirty months imprisonment for an estimated
$1,424,640 worth of software that had been pirated.' 5 4 Rothberg was
then granted a downward departure from this sentence, since he had
not demonstrated any intention to profit from his activities, which
took place prior to development of the new guidelines in 2000.15' This
ruling is interesting, considering that the case was decided on June 14,
2002, five years after the enactment of the NET Act, which removed the
need to demonstrate a profit objective in relation to copyright infringement. According to the court, this decision is "partly a function of the
fact that non-profit-motive criminal copyright cases were (and perhaps
are still) a rarity."' 5 6 The Rothberg opinion demonstrates that at this
point in time, although legislation had been enacted to increase criminal liability for infringement, judicial enforcement of criminal copy5 7
right penalties was still not a common occurrence.1
C.

The Expansion of Criminal Copyright Infringement Under the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act

The final and most recent expansion of criminal copyright penalties occurred in 1998, with the enactment of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA). 151 The DMCA, like the other legislation discussed, was a reaction by Congress to the growth and advancement of
technology.' 5 9 The statute disallows the circumvention of technological tools that have been implemented to protect copyrighted works
from being reproduced illegally, and also bans trafficking in prohibited
tools that are capable of circumventing technology. 160 The Content
Scrambling System (CSS), which prevents the copying of DVDs, is one
151. See Policy Report, supra note 131.
152. 222 F. Supp. 2d 1009 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
153. Id. at 1012.
154. United States v. Rothberg, No. CR 85, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1569 (N.D. Ill.
Feb. 1, 2002).
155. Rothberg, 222 F. Supp. 2d at 1018.
156. Id.
157. See Policy Report, supra note 131.

158. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000 & Supp. 2002).
159. Penney, supra note 77, at 9.
160. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000); see also Raymond T. Nimmer, First Amendment
Speech and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act: A Proper Marriage(Univ. of Houston
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such technological tool that cannot be modified. 161 Sections 1201 and
1202 of the DMCA make it illegal to remove CSS technology from 62a
1
protected DVD or other work in order to make unauthorized copies.
Violations of these sections may lead to criminal sanctions described
in § 1204.163 Specifically, similar to the guidelines in § 506 of the
Copyright Act, 164 an individual must violate the DMCA "willfully165and
for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain.

If

these criteria are satisfied, a fine of up to $500,000 and possible
imprisonment of up to five years may be imposed upon the
infringer. 166 Following one's first offense, fines of up to $1,000,000
and possible imprisonment of up to 10 years are applicable. 167 The
DMCA marks the last time Congress enhanced the criminal penalties
available for copyright infringement. The Act has been highly controversial, and as a result, officials have been reluctant to treat these
16 8
offenses as major crimes.

D.

Criminal Penalties Applied to Peer-to-PeerNetworks

Traditionally, criminal penalties have "not played much of a role
in copyright regulation," and until recently, no criminal sanctions had
been used against peer-to-peer file-sharers. 169 The Department of Justice (DOJ) announced on August 25, 2004 the "first federal enforcement action ever taken against criminal copyright theft on peer-to-peer
Law Center 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid =
572886.
161. Penney, supra note 77, at 11.
162. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-02 (2000). Section 1201 of the DMCA contains language

that disallows devices that are primarily designed to circumvent technology related to
protecting copyrighted works or that are marketed for use in circumvention. Id.
Section 1202 clarifies that legal remedies should be applied to any individual who
knowingly removes or alters Copyright Management Information (CMI) and thus
facilitates infringement. Id.

163. 17 U.S.C. § 1204(a) (2000) ("Any person who violates section 1201 or 1202
willfully and for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain- (1) shall
be fined not more than $500,000 or imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or both, for
the first offense; and (2) shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned for
not more than 10 years, or both, for any subsequent offense.").

164. 17 U.S.C. § 506 (2000) (amended 2005).
165. 17 U.S.C. § 1204(a) (2000).

166. 17 U.S.C. § 1204(a)(1) (2000).
167. 17 U.S.C § 1204(a)(2) (2000).
168. See Sparkler, supra note 39, at 1137.
169. Penney, supra note 77, at 3.
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networks."' 7 ° This step by the government was a component of a
larger mission to protect innovation and creative thought in the economy. The criminal investigation by the DOJ was code-named "Operation Digital Gridlock," and involved the seizure of computers and
7
equipment from six locations in Texas, New York, and Wisconsin.' 1
The DOJ targeted individuals who shared at least 100 gigabytes of digital files.172 According to Attorney General John Ashcroft, "[This] investigative action sends a clear message to online thieves who steal the
[And to] those who think
hard work and innovation of others ....
nothing of downloading those stolen goods to their computers or MP3
players."'

1 73

Following this statement, the DOJ announced its first criminal
conviction for peer-to-peer copyright theft in January 2005. Two individuals, William Towbridge and Michael Chicoine, pleaded guilty 1to
"conspiracy to commit felony criminal copyright infringement.' 7 4
Both men belonged to a group titled the "Underground Network," and
both maintained "Direct Connect hubs" that made various copyrighted
works, including music, games, and computer software, available to
others. 1 75 Although not yet sentenced, these offenders face maximum
penalties of five years in prison and fines of $250,000 under current
copyright law. 1 76 The government is now pursuing similar criminal
investigative actions, and such efforts could be facilitated by the
enhanced criminal penalties Congress has suggested for copyright
infringement. 1 77 An example of proposed legislation that would promote more criminal investigations for copyright infringement on peerto-peer networks is described in detail below.

170. See John Ashcroft, Attorney Gen. of the U.S., Prepared Statement of Attorney
General John Ashcroft, Digital Gridlock Announcement (Aug. 25, 2004), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/AshcroftRemarks082504.htm
[hereinafter Ashcroft Statement].
171. Id.
172. Id. For reference, one gigabyte of storage holds approximately 250 MP3 files or
songs. Id.
173. Id.
174. Roy Mark, DOJ Scores First Criminal P2P Convictions, INTERNET NEWS, Jan. 19,
2005, http://www.internetnews.com/xSP/article.php/3461501.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Final Guilty Plea in Operation Digital
Gridlock, First Federal Peer-to-Peer Copyright Piracy Crackdown (May 31, 2005),
availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/tannerPlea.htm.
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Legislation Proposed in the 108th Congress: A Possible Solution to
Piracy on Peer-to-Peer Networks

As copyright infringement continues to endanger the recording
and motion picture industries and artists, it is within the power of
Congress to craft solutions. In response to the rampant copyright
infringement committed through peer-to-peer networks, Congressman
Lamar Smith of Texas introduced the Piracy Deterrence and Education
Act of 2004.178 Congressman Smith, who has voiced many strong
opinions regarding piracy and technology, declared:
I strongly believe we need more enforcement of already-existing laws
on piracy .. . especially in the new digital world. No one can deny

that piracy and intellectual property theft cost American businesses
billions of dollars and hundreds of thousands of jobs each year. But a
double standard exists when a vast majority [of] people who would
never shoplift a CD at a record store think nothing when it comes to
downloading entire albums from peer-to-peer networks. Both shoplifting and downloading copyright-protected material are illegal and
represent a direct theft to artists, software developers, and others
whose livelihoods depend on their creations.... We must find ways to
protect intellectual property while working with, not against, our tech1 79
nology industry.
The ideas expressed in Congressman Smith's statement are significantly represented within the legislation he recently proposed and
supported. With the support of other congressional representatives,
the Piracy Deterrence and Education Act of 2004 was approved by the
House on September 28, 2004.180 As it would be nearly impossible to
completely prevent the piracy of copyrighted works through digital
means, the government was seeking to deter individuals from participating in unlawful activities and causing damages to copyright holders
and the economy.
After the House approved the Piracy Deterrence and Education
Act on a voice vote, the provisions of the bill were combined with various other pieces of legislation, such as the Protecting Intellectual
Rights Against Theft and Expropriation Act' 8 1 and the Family Movie
Act, i8 2 into one major piece of intellectual property legislation, entitled
178. H.R. 4077, 108th Cong. (2004).
179. Lamar Smith, Issues: Technology and Piracy, http://www.lamarsmith.house.
gov/issues.asp (follow "Congressman Smith on Issues" hyperlink; then follow

"Technology" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 22, 2006).
180. H.R. 4077, 108th Cong. (2004).
181. S. 2237, 108th Cong. (2004).
182. H.R. 4586, 108th Cong. (2004).
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the Intellectual Property Protection Act of 2004.83 On Novemeber 11,
2004, the Senate passed the Family Entertainment and Copyright Act
of 2004,184 a shorter version of the Intellectual Property Protection
Act."' 5 The Piracy Deterrance and Education Act was dropped from
that bill1 8 6 but it was recently announed that Senate leadership was
attempting to pass a substitute version before adjournment in 2006.187
Therefore, it is useful to evaluate the merits of the ideas presented by
the Piracy Deterrence and Education Act.
The Piracy Deterrence and Education Act of 2004 proposed possible solutions to the current piracy problems, and the legislation can be
categorized into two broad ideas: (1) the deterrence of piracy through
development of educational programs and increasing efforts to educate
the public on the damaging effects of copyright infringement; and (2)
the deterrence of piracy through enhanced criminal penalties for copyright infringement and more rigorous enforcement of the production
and distribution rights of copyright holders. A further exploration into
these two objectives may clarify the advantages and disadvantages of
the proposed legislation.
1)

Educational Efforts

According to Mitch Bainwol, Chairman and CEO of the RIAA,
"Despite some encouraging signs, piracy continues to plague the music
community. There's an essential role for education and enforcement
by copyright owners."' 8 8 In addition, Cary Sherman, President of the
RIAA, stated:
College students are some of the most avid music fans. The music
habits and customs they develop now are likely to stay with them for
life. It's especially important for us to educate them about the law, the
harm suffered by musicians, labels and retailers alike when music is
stolen, and the great legal ways to enjoy music online.' 8 9
183. H.R. 2391, 108th Cong. (2004).
184. S. 3021, 108th Cong. (2004).
185. Press Release, Public Knowledge, Public Knowledge Reacts to Passage of
Copyright Legislation (Nov. 22, 2004), available at http://publicknowledge.org/press
room/pri 12204.
186. Id.
187. Publicknowledge.org, Substitute for H.R. 4077 to Pass?, http://www.public
knowledge.org (search "H.R. 4077") (last visited Feb. 23, 2006).
188. See Recording Industry Association of America, RIAA Applauds Senate Passage
of the ART Act, http://www.riaa.com/news/newsletter/062504.asp (last visited Feb.
23, 2006). The provisions of the ART Act have been incorporated into H.R. 4077, The
Piracy Deterrence and Education Act of 2004.
189. Garofano, supra note 55.
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These statements clearly indicate the RIAA's support for educational programs. Over the last several years, new technological
advances, including the Internet, have become even more widespread
and available to a larger percentage of the population. Internet-based
file-sharing has continued to grow at a rapid rate, as a result of convenience and ease of access. These events are of obvious concern for
lawmakers and Congress takes the position that "illegal and dangerous
activity on publicly accessible peer-to-peer file sharing services is
harmful" and that "all appropriate measures to protect consumers and
children and [to] prevent such illegal activity should be considered."' 90
The convenience and ease of downloading may influence individuals to share files and violate the copyright laws without truly understanding the consequences of their actions. 9 ' Polls have revealed that
a majority of Americans do not believe that file-sharing is wrong, nor
do they believe downloading music constitutes theft.' 92 As a result,
copyright infringement has become well-accepted by a large number of
Americans from all demographic groups, 1 93 and many "find it very
hard to believe that there's really a law out there that [prevents such
activities and] says the stuff the copyright law says.'

94

What may sur-

prise copyright owners most is that these views are commonly
expressed by individuals who are well-educated and typically members
9
of wealthier classes.1

5

When these facts are taken into consideration, one can clearly see
the possible advantages of programs that educate the public on the
issues regarding infringement. The Piracy Deterrence and Education
Act of 2004 suggests achieving these educational objectives through
commanding the Director of the FBI to develop a program, lasting no
longer than eighteen months, that would utilize warning letters to deter
copyright infringement through the Internet. 1 96 Such warning letters
would be sent directly from the Department of Justice to Internet service providers to illuminate the occurrence of illegal behavior. 1 9 7 It

would then be the responsibility of the ISP to forward these warnings,
which would discuss in detail the applicable penalties for illegal behav190. House Passes Piracy Act, Adds Criminal Penalties to Online Infringement, 13-3
6 (2004).
191. Penney, supra note 77, at 17.
192. Id. at 24.
193. See id. at 25.
194. Jessica Litman, Copyright Noncompliance (Or Why We Can't "Just Say Yes" to
Licensing), 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 237, 238-39 (1997).
195. See Penney, supra note 77, at 24 n.134.
196. H.R. 4077, 108th Cong. § 3(a) (2004).
197. Id.
MEALEY'S LITIG. REP. INTELL. PROP.
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ior of those who are accused of infringement, to their customers. 198
This method of educating Internet users about the consequences of
illegal file-sharing would not result in additional costs for ISPs, since
the Department of Justice would maintain a budget to reimburse them
for "all reasonable direct costs incurred by such service providers in
identifying the proper recipients of the warning letters . . . and for-

warding the letters."1 99 The warning letters would not increase the
likelihood that the identified individuals would face penalties or lawsuits, because the legislation also states that the ISP should not release
contact information for a subscriber unless the proper legal processes
have been followed. 20 0 The purpose of the letters would be purely to
raise awareness of the civil and criminal penalties outlined in the Copyright Act for infringing conduct, and therefore, this legislation would
not assist the government in discovering new streamlined methods of
identifying infringers.
Additionally, within the Office of the Associate Attorney General,
the Act would establish an "Internet-Use Education Program."20 1 The
program would "educate the general public concerning the value of
copyrighted works and the effects of the theft of such works on those
who create them" and "the privacy, security, and other risks of using
the Internet [for file sharing purposes]. 20 2 In general, the program
would develop resources to educate specific groups of Internet users
who appear likely to violate copyright laws, such as college students.
It is possible that these education efforts, including the programs
previously discussed and suggested by the Piracy Deterrence and Education Act of 2004, can help to curb the problems facing musicians
and the recording industry in an environment of new, developing technology and widespread use of peer-to-peer networks. Although these
programs by themselves would not be a sufficient solution to the problem of music piracy, they are certainly a valuable supplement to other
courses of action. To support this conclusion, one can clearly observe
the value of education on copyright issues through surveying recent
programs and initiatives on college campuses. Due to the fast speed of
university networks, "copyright piracy is becoming as easy to undertake as changing channels on a television [and] an increasing number
of American university students now appear to prefer engaging in peerto-peer piracy instead of watching television, not that either is necessa198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

H.R.
H.R.
H.R.
H.R.
H.R.

4077,
4077,
4077,
4077,
4077,

108th
108th
108th
108th
108th

Cong.
Cong.
Cong.
Cong.
Cong.

§
§
§
§
§

3 (2004).
3(c) (2004).
3(b)(2) (2004).
5(a) (2004).
5 (2004).
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rily an educational activity. "203 Many institutions of higher education
offer "powerful computing and broadband distribution capacity" to
students for educational purposes.20 4 Unfortunately, these resources
20 5
also support the occurrence of music piracy on college campuses.
Currently, the use of legal alternatives on college campuses is
growing, due in part to strong educational efforts by copyright owners
and campaigns developed by various universities. Some of the measures undertaken by institutions of higher education include programs
that involve sending emails and letters from high levels of administration to college students to clarify the importance of copyright laws and
the significance of the penalties that students could face.20 6 Several
universities, such as Brown University and Dartmouth College, are
focusing on emphasizing university policies on proper use of digital
media and other copyright-related ideas. 20 7 The policies recently
updated by schools include statements that copyright infringement is
illegal, that infringing behavior is intolerable, and descriptions of
methods used to catch students that are violating the law.20 8 Many
schools have dedicated a variety of online resources to explaining such
policies with the goal of promoting student education, which they
introduce to students as early as during freshman orientation programs.20 9 Some of these schools have gone so far as to require students to read tutorials and demonstrate their understanding of
copyright infringement through passing quizzes and tests. 2 10 In addi-

tion to these efforts, many universities have distributed notices, fliers,
and posters conveying that infringement over peer-to-peer networks is
unacceptable behavior and that students participating in wrongful
behavior will face consequences. 2 1'
203. Peer-to-Peer Piracy on University Campuses: An Update, Hearings Before
Subcomm. on Courts, The Internet, and Intellectual Property of the House of
Representatives Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 1 (2004) [hereinafter P2P on
Campus].
204. Id. at 13.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 10.
207. Id. at 27.
208. Id.
209. E.g., Princeton University, Office of Information Technology, http://www.help
desk.princeton.edu/kb/display.plx?id=9407 (last visited Feb. 25, 2006); University of
Virginia, When I Go to UVA, http://www.itc.virginia.edu/pubs/docs/RespComp/
videos/home.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2006).
210. See P2P on Campus, supra note 203, at 27.
211. Id. at 13.
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Many of these efforts express that the "education of students is a
fundamental component of efforts to counter unauthorized file-sharing and to provide a legal and ethical framework for the use of copyrighted works. '2 12 Similarly, educational efforts can be useful to the
general public as a collective whole. As a result, the education programs set forth in the Piracy Deterrence and Education Act of 2004 are
valuable in the mission to improve current music piracy problems.
2)

Enhancement of Criminal Penalties

As previously discussed, U.S. copyright law already contains provisions that prescribe criminal punishments in certain circumstances
for the infringement of copyright-protected works. To achieve Congress's goal of deterring such activities, the Piracy Deterrence and Education Act of 2004 suggested enhanced criminal penalties for "the
willful infringement of copyrighted works and for the distribution of
these works by electronic means. ' 2 13 Under the new law, individuals
who trade a large amount of music illegally on peer-to-peer networks
could face time in prison.2 14 This proposal would facilitate the prosecution of infringers by the Department of Justice, which may help to
deter piracy.
The Act would authorize fifteen billion dollars for the prosecution
of copyright violations under Title 17.215 Next, the bill suggests
amended wording to § 506(a) of Title 17 to enhance criminal penalties
for those who distribute copyrighted works to the public via peer-topeer networks and through other Internet technology.2 16 The wording
used in the bill technically means that prosecutors would not be
required to prove actual downloading of $1,000 in copyrighted works
took place, but instead, would only need to prove that the files were

212. Id. at 15.
213. House Passes Piracy Act, Adds Criminal Penalties to Online Infringement, supra
note 190, at 2.
214. See David McGuire, Lawmakers Push Prison for Online Pirates, WASH. POST,
Mar. 31, 2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A40145-2004Mar31?

language.
215. H.R. 4077, 108th Cong. § 7 (2004).
216. H.R. 4077, 108th Cong. § 10 (2004).
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available to the public in a shared folder,2 17 which is a component of
many commonly used file-sharing programs.2 1 8
The enhancement of criminal penalties suggested by Congressman Smith's legislation, combined with the additional funding to prosecute more individuals, is intended to deter people from partaking in
infringing behavior on peer-to-peer networks with threats of large fines
and jail time. According to Congressman Howard Berman, a co-sponsor of the bill, "[The government has had] a paucity of criminal copyit has become clear that law enforcers need
right prosecutions [and]
2 19
additional authority.
Although increases in criminal penalties may deter a percentage
of individuals who would have otherwise participated in illegal filesharing, commentators have argued these penalties may be too severe
and questioned whether they truly can curb the massive amounts of
copyright infringement occurring over the Internet. According to Gigi
Sohn, the president of Public Knowledge, a Washington-based civil liberties group, 2 20 "Congress needs to think real carefully about whether
it wants 12-year-olds hauled away in handcuffs for making files available over peer-to-peer networks. ' 22 1 Considering that the average college student maintains over 1,100 illegally downloaded music files on
his or her personal computer, enacting this legislation could make a
large number of Americans, specifically young Americans, prospective
criminals.2 2 2
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed Piracy Deterrence and Education Act, one must consider whether increasing the
penalties for infringement of intellectual property rights would deter
violators and, if so, whether such penalties would prove too severe.
Even if implemented, enhanced criminal penalties may not provide a
217. Id. If enacted, the bill would change the Copyright Act to state, "Criminal
Infringement- Any person who(1) infringes a copyright willfully and for purposes of commercial advantage or
private financial gain,
(2) infringes a copyright willfully by the reproduction or distribution, including by the
offering for distribution to the public by electronic means, during any 180-day period, of
1 or more copies or phonorecords of 1 or more copyrighted works, which have a total
retail value of more than $1,000." Id. (emphasis added).
218. Declan McCullagh, House Votes to Target P2P Pirates,NEws.coM, Sept. 28, 2004,
http://news.com.com/House+votes+to+target+p2p+pirates/2100-1028_3-5387682.
html.
219. See McGuire, supra note 214.
220. Public Knowledge, http://www.publicknowledge.org (last visited Mar. 21.
2006).
221. McGuire, supra note 214.
222. Id.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol28/iss2/4

32

20061

Morea: The Future of Music in a Digital Age: The Ongoing Conflict Betwee
THE FUTURE OF MUSIC IN A DIGITAL AGE

227

desirable level of deterrence if judges decline to impose stiffer penalties to infringers. This has occurred in past situations, such as in
United States v. Rothberg, in which the law was changed but was not
appropriately enforced.223
In terms of the severity of criminal penalties, a great deal of support exists for the view that applying strong criminal penalties to
music piracy would go several steps too far and not effectively curb the
problems facing the music industry today. First, expanded criminal
copyright law may "inhibit the free flow of information and thus
impose costs that outweigh the benefits from discouraging piracy. "224
The NET Act and the DMCA, 22 5 as previously discussed, have already
strengthened criminal law to an unparalleled extent, and it would most
likely be an inadequate solution to the industry's problems to further
enhance criminal penalties for copyright infringement over peer-topeer networks. 226 These enhanced criminal penalties would do more
harm than good, since the simple threat of criminalization could discourage the behavior that copyright law was originally intended to
support-"the growth of learning and culture for the public welfare."' 22 7 In general, the strengthening of criminal penalties is not in

the best interest of the public as a whole, and legislation such as The
Piracy Deterrence and Education Act of 2004 only demonstrates Congress's tendency to concentrate on protecting copyright owners
through excessive deterrence of users of copyrighted works. This tendency deprives the public of certain rights and is sure to cause "an
unjust and improper balancing of interests [which are] contrary to the
Constitution's command. ' 228 According to Professor Orlan Lee, "[It is]

plain sense that the criminal law is a highly specialized tool for social
control, useful for certain purpose[s], but not for others [and] when [it
is] improperly used it is capable of producing more evil than good. 229
Overall, the further criminalization of copyright law in relation to filesharing may be one instance where criminal penalties would cause
223. 222 F. Supp. 2d 1009 (N.D. 1W. 2002); see supra note 154 and accompanying

text.
224. See Note, The Criminalizationof Copyright Infringement in the Digital Era, 112
L. REV. 1705, 1705 (1999).
225. For information on the NET Act and DMCA, see supra notes 133, 160 and
accompanying text.
226. See The Criminalization of Copyright Infringement in the Digital Era, supra note
224, at 1718.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 1722.
HARV.

229. ORLAN LEE & T.A. ROBERTSON,
(Martinus Nijhoff ed., 1973).

"MORAL ORDER" AND THE CRIMINAL LAW
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more harm than good, and using criminal law to fight Internet piracy
could introduce a real danger of chilling the valuable, socially beneficial activity of enjoying music over the Internet.2 3 °
In addition, several legal commentators have determined that in
general, "copyright infringement is not culpable enough to justify
criminal sanctions. "231 Professor Steven Penney points out that "criminal law should not be used for things most people reckon not really
wrong or, if wrong, merely trivial. 2 3 2 Many Americans do not believe
that music piracy is morally wrong and many have no qualms, despite
the efforts of the government and certain interest groups, about participating in such unlawful behavior.23 3 Polls conducted in 2000 suggest
that almost half of all contributors believed it was morally acceptable
to download music from the Internet. 234 Since similar statistics show
that a large number of people find nothing significantly wrong with
copyright infringement over peer-to-peer networks, this might suggest
infringement should not be criminalized.2 3 5 However, it is possible
that the views and opinions of the public could change over time, and
as such, the idea presented above is not by itself enough to discount
the possible benefits of criminalizing copyright infringement. Additionally, it would not be fair to the artists who suffer losses to depend
solely on the opinion of the majority in this case.
In looking beyond the moral beliefs surrounding music piracy,
Professor Joel Feinberg states that criminal penalties are justified only
when they are necessary to prevent the threat of considerable harm to
others. 2 36 To understand Feinberg's theories and how they can be
applied to this argument, one must identify what factors determine the
degree of harm caused to others. Feinberg identifies three of these factors, which are the following: magnitude of the harm, probability of its
237
occurrence, and social value of the activity that leads to the harm.

230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

See id. at 66.
Penney, supra note 77, at 23.
Id.
See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
See WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE
FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT (2004), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/
tfisher/PTKIntroduction.pdf.
235. See generally AMANDA LENHART & SUSANNAH Fox, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE
PROJECT, DOWNLOADING FREE MUSIC: INTERNET MUSIC LOVERS DON'T THINK IT'S STEALING

(2000), http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIPOnline Music-Report2.pdf.
236. JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS: THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (1st
ed. 1984).
237. See Penney, supra note 77, at 26 (explaining Feinberg's theory and how it can
be applied to copyright).
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In the case of copyright, the overall harm is the economic loss to artists caused by peer-to-peer file-sharing, which is indefensible because
it defies a legal rule. It is very difficult to understand the magnitude
and probability of harm caused by file-sharing. It is not certain that a
loss always exists, since a consumer who steals music online may not
be interested in the material if it was not acquired for free. When this
obstacle is combined with the fact that peer-to-peer technology can
benefit society, since content could be distributed efficiently and
cheaply using the technology, one can see the difficulty that arises
when applying Feinberg's harm principle to copyright infringement
over peer-to-peer networks.238
Since it is not easy to determine the magnitude of harm caused by
infringement or whether it is serious enough to warrant criminalization, one must consider that enhanced criminalization of copyright
infringement may not be a positive solution to the problems of the
recording industry.2 39 It is important to acknowledge that "criminalization entails profound social costs, both private and public, and
should therefore be used reluctantly and with restraint.

'2 40

Thus,

Feinberg suggests that criminalization of copyright would be justified
only if no other means of preventing harm could be effective.
Although time consuming and costly, civil remedies are available, and
a variety of other solutions could be implemented, including the utilization of digital rights management and technology, alternative compensation systems, and the promotion of other legal digital music
services. 241 Feinberg advises that criminalization should be used only
as an absolute last resort. 24 2 The ideas of those presented above

clearly suggest that the problem has not grown to the point where
criminal penalties are appropriate.243 Additionally, if criminal copyright law was strengthened by the government, citizens who would otherwise obey the law may feel aggravated and as a result, may not feel
any sympathy for the recording industry.244

238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

Id. at 27.
Id. at 28.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 30.
See Sang Jo Jong, Criminalizationof Netizens for their Access to On-line Music, 4
J. OF KOREAN L. 51, 65 (2004), available at http://ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=658141.
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Conclusions on the Potential Effectiveness of the Piracy
Deterrence and Education Act

According to Congress, copyright infringement is "currently at a
level of ongoing and persistent illegal and dangerous activity on publicly accessible peer-to-peer file sharing services [and] is harmful to
consumers, minors, and the economy. '2 4 5 Legislation increasing the
criminal penalties for copyright infringement does not, however,
appear to be an effective solution. While the educational measures
described in the Act could prove somewhat useful, they would not radically change the current circumstances facing record companies.
Since copyright law is complex and often difficult to explain even to
law students, educational efforts may have limited success in changing
the habits of young adults, who may not fully understand the law, or
may even be resistant to obeying it.2 4 6 Furthermore, there are reasons
to avoid "accidentally taking a large percentage of the American people, either small businesses or citizens, into the gray area of the criminal law."' 2 4 7 Thus, rather than supporting more legislation that would
enhance criminal penalties or otherwise punish consumers for using
new technology to infringe copyrights, the music industry could utilize new business models or systems to embrace technology.
IV.

THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF EMBRACING PEER-TO-PEER
TECHNOLOGY

In today's computer-based environment, peer-to-peer file sharing
software has been downloaded worldwide over 600,000,000 times.2 48
These staggering statistics represent activities that threaten the incentives for innovators and artists to create new works. As previously discussed, the recording industry has made numerous attempts to curb
the illegal behavior of consumers using peer-to-peer networks. Congress has assisted by introducing legislation, such as the Piracy Deterrence and Education Act of 2004, to expand protection for copyright
holders. Despite the possible deterrence value of such legislation, it
can be deemed too severe. This leads one to wonder what actions
would be effective, since a problem certainly exists in the fact that file245. H.R. 4077, 108th Cong. § 9
246. See WILLIAM W. FISHER III,
FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT 7 (2004),
tfisher/PTKIntroduction.pdf.
247. See Loren, supra note 78, at
248. H.R. 4077, 108th Cong. § 9

(2004).
PROMISES To KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE
available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/

862 (citations omitted).
(2004).
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sharing has negatively impacted recording artists and the incentives
for making new artistic creations.2 4 9
In response to these various actions of the government and the
recording industry, those who wish to participate in file-sharing have
suggested that "copyright industries are once again crying 'wolf and
that, like the new technologies of the past, file-sharing will be seen, in
hindsight, to provide beneficial opportunities for all . . .".o It can
also be noted that "no legal rule is strong enough to overcome a radical
technical innovation," and therefore, eventually the benefits of peer-topeer technology may beat out the efforts of the RIAA and others to put
a damper on technological innovation. 25 1 Evidence shows that peer-topeer file-sharing can be an efficient method of sharing information,
and society can benefit from embracing this new technology, rather
than fighting so fervently against its growth and enrichment.25 2
According to Professor Neil Netanel,
[Peer-to-Peer] file sharing is not just downloading music and movies
for free. It is a vehicle for finding works that are otherwise not available, discovering new genres, making personalized compilations, and
posting creative remixes, sequels, and modifications of popular works.
By engaging in such activities, people who might previously have been
passive consumers now assert a more active, self-defining role in the
enjoyment, use, and creation of cultural expression. They also share
their interest, creativity and active enjoyment with others.25 3
This quote shows the enormous potential benefits that could
come with further development of peer-to-peer software. This potential is far more than just transferring music files, and these networks
could lead to even more valuable technological advancements. According to Professor Lawrence Lessig, "[T]he most important peer-to-peer
technologies could be more efficient caching technologies.."25 4 This
means various types of files and information would have the potential
to be transferred more easily, more efficiently, and more reliably at a
significantly decreased cost. In addition, peer-to-peer networks present enormous opportunities to encourage innovation and creativity,
which is precisely what the framers of the Constitution intended to
achieve by authorizing Congress to enact copyright protection. The
249.
250.
251.
252.

See Liebowitz, supra note 54, at 14.
Id. at 3.
Shell, supra note 64.
See Jessica Litman, Sharing and Stealing, 27

HASTINGS COMM.

& ENrT. LJ. 1

(2004).
253. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a Noncommerical Use Levy to Allow Free
Peer-to-PeerFile Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 3 (2003).
254.

LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS

136 (2d ed. 2002).
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possibilities are endless, and the reasons to embrace peer-to-peer technology can best be understood through the words of Professor Lessig:
We have the potential to expand the reach of creativity to an extraordinary range of culture and commerce. Technology could enable a
whole generation to create - remixed films, new forms of music, digital
art, a new kind of storytelling, writing, a new technology for poetry,
criticism, political activism - and then, through the infrastructure of
the Internet, share that creativity with others. This is the art through
which free culture is built.2 55
When these ideas are taken into consideration, one can formulate
a strong argument that the recording industry, as well as the economy,
may benefit from the expanded use of peer-to-peer networks, rather
than going to great lengths to deter the use of this technology. Society
today is much different than that which existed a century ago.
Through the introduction of numerous new technologies, Americans
have all the information they could fathom at their fingertips. Technology has changed the way people behave, the way they travel, the
way they communicate, the way they conduct their lives on a daily
basis, and even their longevity through improved healthcare technologies and access to information. With the introduction of the Internet,
an individual can easily keep in touch with friends, conduct business,
invest in the stock market, plan vacations, and shop, without leaving
the comfort of one's home. If the government establishes laws that
prevent creative minds from sharing new ideas and new technology,
there is no way to determine the negative impacts on society.
V.

THE RISE OF LEGITIMATE SERVICES AND NEW WAYS TO COMPENSATE
RECORDING ARTISTS

By embracing technology and accepting that copyright law must
change, creators of various types of creative works may look to other
alternatives to collect compensation. Many organizations, such as the
Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), encourage artists to embrace
new technology, rather than advocate increased civil and criminal penalties for copyright infringement. According to the EFF:
Industry representatives say that the subpoenas and lawsuits are necessary to protect recording artists. But suing fans doesn't pay artists.
Neither does threatening every Internet user's civil liberties. We need a
constructive solution. EFF advocates offering fans a legal way to use
[Peer-to-Peer] programs while ensuring that artists get paid.256
255. Id. at 9.
256. See Electronic Frontier Foundation, http://www.eff.org/share (last visited Feb.

22, 2006).
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Legal Downloading with iTunes and Napster

While the recording industry and the government have been busy
promoting movements to stop piracy over peer-to-peer networks, legal
file-sharing services have emerged that are fully supported by the
industry. The marketplace has responded to the needs of Internet
savvy consumers by introducing inventive ideas, such as the Apple
iPod and the Apple iTunes service.2" 7 The iTunes Music Store was
launched in April 2003, and it has presently sold over 300 million
songs.25 8 It is developing a creative new business model that supports
digital music. 2 59 iTunes offers customers the ability to purchase songs

for 99¢ per download, and it also enables customers to buy full albums
for $9.99.260 These prices are significantly lower than the cost of a
typical CD in a music store. iTunes provides flexible terms, as well as
protection against illegal distribution. 261 According to advertisements
for the iTunes Music Store, a customer can select his or her songs from
a library of more than two million tracks from major and independent
record labels. 26 2 A customer can also hear a short, thirty-second preview of the song, to confirm it is the song he or she desires to
purchase.2 6 3 Additionally, iTunes provides customers with exclusive
and pre-release tracks. 26 4 Although this legitimate service still does
not come close to offering the selection available on illegitimate networks, it is a great step towards developing a new means of obtaining
music that embraces technology and compensates artists.
Similarly, Napster has reemerged as a legal music service, offering
unlimited legal downloading for $14.95 per month.2 6 5 The Napster To
Go service utilizes a different business model than iTunes, providing
consumers who download large quantities of music the opportunity to
rent the music and to transfer it to portable players without spending
thousands of dollars.2 6 6 The customer will retain access to the music,
257. See Kasunic, supra note 73, at 1.
258. Glenn Peoples, Your Rights Reserved? The Copy-Protection Battle Will Shape
Apple's Multimedia Future, MACWORLD, Feb. 1, 2006, at 22.
259. For more information on the iTunes Music Store, see Apple, http://
www.apple.com/itunes/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2006).

260. Id.
261. See Kasunic, supra note 73, at 8.
262. E.g., Apple, http://www.apple.com/itunes/playlists/
2006).

(last visited Feb. 23,

263. Id.
264. Id.
265. See generally Napster, http://www.napster.com (last visited Mar. 21, 2006).
266. Walter S. Mossberg, 'Napster To Go' Offers Alternative to iTunes - If You Keep on
Paying, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2005, at B1.
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as long as he or she continues to pay the monthly fee. The new service
may prove to be tough competition for Apple, since those wishing to
obtain many songs will not want to pay 99¢ per download.26 7 The
Napster service is another legal alternative for consumers who enjoy
filling their MP3 players with their favorite music, without going to
their local store to buy the newest over-priced CD. Some problems with
the Napster To Go service do exist, including the fact that consumers
will need to pay additional money to keep a song permanently or to
burn it to a CD and the software is more complicated to use than
Apple's iTunes Music Store. 268 Despite these issues, the Napster service does demonstrate a step towards encouraging digital music in a
legal fashion. The services discussed represent only a selection of the
legitimate digital music services that have been developed. As the
International Federation of the Phonographic Industry Digital Music
Report for 2006 describes, the number of online sites that allow consumers to legally purchase music has increased to 335.269
The idea of legitimate music downloading services is being widely
encouraged on college campuses to cut down on illegal file-sharing
and to provide compensation for copyright holders. Many universities
are partnering with legitimate services to deter students from committing copyright infringement on a massive scale. For example, Pennsylvania State University partnered with the new Napster service in
2 70
November 2003, paying a fee so students can access the music.

Napster then pays royalties to copyright holders. 2 71' This system allows
students to download large quantities of music, but at the same time
artists are compensated for their work. Many schools have already
agreed to offer legitimate downloading services to their students, and
to further encourage this behavior, Sony BMG Music Entertainment
has led the Campus Action Network.2 7 2 This group has worked to
encourage the introduction of legitimate services, such as the new
Napster, on college campuses around the country. 273 Large-scale
efforts to promote the introduction of legal services on college cam267. Id.
268. Id.
269. See generally INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUSTRY, IFPI
DIGITAL Music REPORT OF 2006, available at http://www.ifpi.org/site-content/library/
digital-music-report-2006.pdf.
270. See P2P on Campus, supra note 203, at 10.
271. Napster, Napster on Campus, http://www.napster.com/napster-oncampus.

html (last visited Feb. 23, 2006).
272. P2P on Campus, supra note 203, at 10.

273. Id.
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puses may prove to make a significant dent in the online theft of music
that has burdened the recording industry.
Data issued by the RIAA in November 2004 suggests that many
Americans are becoming more willing to pay fees to download material
and to use Internet services, showing that the number of individuals
who have paid to download music has increased 150% since late
2003.274 This data shows that the development of more sites, such as
iTunes and Napster, could be one successful alternative to suing customers to prevent music piracy.
B.

Alternative Compensation Systems

As discussed above, it seems inevitable that society must fully
embrace the potential that peer-to-peer networks and other new technologies have to offer. In a digital environment with constant technological development that offers an amazing array of new techniques in
which music can be produced and disseminated, copyright law first
set forth over one hundred years ago seems out of place. 2 75 However, it
would also be unfair to allow all forms of downloading at the expense
of hardworking artists, who would then have few incentives to continue creating and sharing their work with the world. In order to maintain a thriving economy with a wealth of creativity and innovation, a
system must be developed that will simultaneously embrace the potential of the Internet and compensate individuals for their creations.
Although the legal file-sharing services previously discussed take a valuable step towards this goal, they do not present the most efficient
method, since the music libraries available through these services still
do not offer the wide selection of copyrighted material that is available
illegally on current file-sharing networks. As a result, many have suggested that the implementation of an alternate compensation system
might be the best option, which would concurrently make wide-spread
downloading legal, while providing sufficient compensation and motivation to artists.

2 76

Several models have been suggested as feasible options for shaping an alternate compensation system to pay rewards to artists. A voluntary collective licensing system, a noncommercial use levy, and a
government-run rewards system are among the options that would
274.
Wave
visited
275.
276.
2006).

See Recording Industry Association of America, Illegal File Sharing Targeted in
of New Lawsuits, http://www.riaa.com/news/newsletter/ll1804.asp (last
Mar. 24, 2006).
See Fisher, supra note 246, at 7.
E.g., Electronic Frontier Foundation, http://www.eff.org (last visited Feb. 23,
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offer positive inputs for a solution to the problem of music piracy.2 7 7
In support of these alternatives, Fred von Lohman from the Electronic
Frontier Foundation (EFF) stated:
We at EFF believe these kinds of proposals have the benefit of actually
talking about the real issue: how do we get artists compensated while
making [Peer-to-Peer] file sharing legal .... [Elach of these proposals

[for licensing systems] is better than the one in which 60 million American Kazaa users are hunted, ISPs like Verizon are forced to rat out
their subscribers, colleges install electronic surveillance equipment to
chills
monitor their networks, and litigation against Napster's investors
2 78
the climate for investment in innovative new technologies.
1) A Voluntary Collective Licensing System
A voluntary collective licensing system has been identified as a
valuable solution that the recording industry should consider in order
to improve the problems stemming from music piracy. 279 This system
would require the formation of a collecting society made up of copyright holders, which would offer music fans the opportunity to
download unlimited amounts of music legally for small, regular payments to the society. 2 80 The payments could be as small as five dollars
each month.2 8 1
A system utilizing blanket licensing fees to obtain money to compensate artists would be similar to the system in place for commercial
radio. Several parallels can be drawn between the problems currently
facing peer-to-peer networks and those the first commercial radio
broadcasters faced.2 8 2 Around the beginning of commercial radio, the
sense was that "a copyright owner should have the power to demand a
license for every revenue stream dependent on the copyrighted work even revenue from adaptations to other media. '' 283 Based on this idea,
277. See Wendy Hall & Ronit Shukla, Now You See It, Now You Don't: The Digital

Tug-of-War Yields No Winners, but the Genie Is Out of the Bottle, http://
www.larta.org/LAVox/ArticleLinks/2003/030505_music.asp

(last visited Mar. 28,

2006).
278. Id.
279. See Electronic Frontier Foundation, A Better Way Forward: Voluntary
Collective Licensing of Music File Sharing: "Let the Music Play" White Paper,
www.eff.org/share/collective-lic-wp.php (last visited Mar. 24, 2006) [hereinafter
EFF].
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. See Timothy Wu, Copyright's Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L. REv. 278,
280 (2004).
283. Id. at 305.
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the American Society of Broadcasters, Composers, and Publishers
(ASCAP) began to issue blanket licenses for a small price, which then
allowed the performance of works belonging to the society members.2 84 At the time, radio was seen as a means of mass piracy, comparable to how peer-to-peer networks are now viewed. 285 After a great
deal of controversy and a long battle between radio broadcasters and
ASCAP, radio was forced to pay these fees, as it is still required to do
today. As it presently stands, ASCAP is an association that consists of
over 200,000 U.S. songwriters, music publishers, lyricists, and composers. 28 6 This group protects these songwriters and creators by
licensing and distributing royalties for the public performances of their
rightfully owned work.2 8 7 In terms of commercial radio, "an ASCAP
license [now] authorizes performances of many millions of copyrighted musical works in the ASCAP repertory and in the repertories of
' 28 8
over 60 affiliated foreign performing rights organizations.
The implementation of this system would allow music fans to
freely share files in a legal way, without the threat of litigation from the
RIAA. At the same time, artists would be paid for their hard work and
Congress would not be required to drastically overhaul existing copyright law. The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) recently released
ideas for a voluntary collective licensing system that could prove to be
extremely effective. 28 9 EFF suggests that if five dollars was paid each
month by each file-sharer that is already participating in undesirable
infringement, the music industry would collect over three billion dollars in profits. 29 0 This would represent a vast improvement over the

complete lack of compensation copyright holders are now receiving
when music is traded illegally over peer-to-peer networks. 2 91 A voluntary collective licensing system would create a pool of money that
would be available to artists and copyright holders.2 9 2 The money
would be collected by a group formed for that purpose and the group
284. Id. at 307.
285. Id. at 304-05.
286. American Society of Broadcasters, Composers, and Publishers, About ASCAP,
http://www.ascap.com/about/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2006).
287. Id.
288. American Society of Broadcasters, Composers, and Publishers, Customer
Licensees, http://www.ascap.com/licensing/radio (last visited Feb. 23, 2006).
289. EFF, supra note 279.
290. Id. Five dollars is only a suggestion, as this amount could be set at any price a
reasonable consumer would pay.
291. Id.
292. Id.
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would function in a manner similar to ASCAP. 29 3 This system would
also require the development of a method to fairly distribute the collected funds to artists. 29 4 Logically, more popular and well-liked artists should be compensated more for their work.295 This could be
determined by closely monitoring which files are downloaded and listened to most often.29 6 This data may be ascertained in a variety of
ways, such as through a system similar to the well-known Nielsen
system.

29 7

In addition to the profits gained from the blanket license fees
charged, the industry would benefit by avoiding high costs that are
involved in "conventional commercial distribution" of music.

29 8

The

costs that could be avoided include the following: "CD stamping, shipping, storage, shelf space, and radio payola. '2 99 Not only would these
costs be avoided, but the industry may find this system would improve
its reputation, since it would no longer aggravate as many customers
with high CD prices in local music stores. The RIAA would also be
able to abandon its campaign of litigation against individual infringers, which is a strategy that may alienate and frustrate potential
consumers.
A voluntary collective licensing system would clearly be more beneficial for all parties involved than recent attempts to drag customers
and young people through costly lawsuits or to threaten them with
large fines and criminal penalties. There are several advantages to this
plan, including that it would be quick and easy to implement since the
necessary small fees could simply be added to the price of broadband
services through an Internet service provider, the cost of using a college network, or even be added as a fee to download file-sharing
software.3 °° If the fees were paid in these convenient ways, there
would be no need for Congress to become involved or for copyright
law to undergo drastic changes or updates. Many may find the limited
involvement of the government to be desirable.30 '
In addition to these positive aspects of a voluntary collective
licensing system, the further development of creative technology would
be highly encouraged. Under the proposed system, the recording
293. Id.

294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.

298. See Litman, supra note 252, at 32.

299. Id.
300. See EFF, supra note 279.
301. Id.
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industry would gain the most and profits would rise as the occurrence
of file-sharing increased. As technology develops, more file-sharing
would ensue and it would be in the best interest of the recording industry to promote the growth of a "big, open, and innovative Internet. "302
This would be extremely favorable to society, and in this setting, people would have a broad selection of copyrighted works at their disposal. This large selection might even include many works by
independent artists who may have in the past faced difficulty in sharing their work without the backing of major record labels.3 °3 Also, the
growth of the Internet and expansion of activities previously deemed
illegal would allow room for the introduction of new products in the
marketplace, such as more advanced MP3 players and other electronic
gadgets. A thriving marketplace with innovative products would be
advantageous for consumers and would no longer be held back by an
30 4
industry fighting massive loss-producing piracy.
Although this strategy represents a great option for compensating
artists in order to support the wide-spread use of digital music, there
are some negative aspects. First and foremost, the system could only be
truly effective if almost all copyright owners put aside lawsuits and
agreed to participate.30 5 In the present environment, gathering the
support of all copyright holders may prove to be a daunting task.
Additionally, this solution would depend on a single collecting society,
which could leave room for corruption and deceit. Corruption is possible since the organization would have the opportunity to completely
monopolize the industry. Despite these drawbacks of a system utilizing blanket licensing fees to compensate copyright owners, it would
put the recording industry as a whole in a much better position, given
that artists
receive no rewards when individuals illegally download
3o
music.
MiC306

2)

A Noncommercial Use Levy

A model for a "Noncommercial Use Levy" (NUL) has been put
forth by Professor Neil Netanel, who supports the idea of allowing the
free flow of material on peer-to-peer networks.30 7 His idea stems from
various concepts that already exist in American law, including private
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. See Andrea Ottolia & Dan Wielsch, Mapping the Information Environment: Legal
Aspects of Modularization and Digitalization,6 YALE J.L. & TECH. 174, 201 (2004).
305. See EFF, supra note 279.
306. Id.
307. See Netanel, supra note 253.
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copyright charges and compulsory licenses. 30 8 Netanel's proposal
would legalize the use of peer-to-peer networks for the noncommercial
dissemination, modification, and copying of works made available to
the public.30 9 Under his system, those looking to commercially distribute copyrighted works would still need to seek licenses and permission from the copyright owners. 310 The goal of encouraging
unimpeded noncommercial file-swapping would be accomplished
through introducing a tax on peer-to-peer related goods and services,
whose value is amply increased by the existence of file-sharing. As
such, the levy would be placed on peer-to-peer software and service
providers, Internet service providers, computer companies, and developers of devices such as MP3 players and CD burners. 3 11 As a result
of the funds raised by these taxes, copyright holders would receive
compensation for their work, and it would be possible to change the
law to allow individuals to take full advantage of the noncommercial
copying and distribution eased by the use of peer-to-peer technology.312 Netanel suggests that the levy would be negotiated by the copyright holders and the entities that would be forced to pay the levies,
while the U.S. Copyright Office would be involved in settling all disputes between these parties. 3 13 Those taxed would most likely pass
the additional costs to their consumers. As a result, individuals would
now legally have the right to exchange copyrighted files, but ultimately, they would pay for these new rights to the degree that the NUL
was passed down by manufacturers and ISPs. 3 14 In return for the
added expense, individuals would freely use file-sharing technology
without having to deal with the possibility of sabotage on peer-to-peer
networks, which may include the spread of computer viruses or defective files.
Netanel outlines many important components of the proposed
NUL, including the amount of the levy and the manner in which funds
would be dispersed to copyright owners. The amount of the NUL
should be determined, after examination of statistical data, at a sum
that would reasonably compensate creators for all revenues displaced
by file-sharing.3 1 5 As the market changes in the future, the amount
308. Id.
309. Id.

310. Id. at 37.
311.
312.
313.
314.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

43.
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should also be adjusted to account for costs saved and revenues generated by file-sharing.316 The revenues raised through the NUL would be
distributed based on the value of various works. The NUL funds
should be allocated to individual copyright holders according to the
consumer demand for each work, meaning that files downloaded more
often would receive a larger percentage of compensation.317 In order
to determine how often files are downloaded over a peer-to-peer network and how often they are used subsequent to downloading, Netanel
suggests that technology for tracking this data could be utilized,
including digital fingerprinting and sampling technologies. 318 He concludes that "all in all, digital tracking, metering and sampling would
enable a far more accurate measure of a copyright work's value to audiences than the current copyright regime, and 3would
do so without
19
requiring user payments per download or use.

There are several positive aspects of Netanel's NUL, including the
fact that artists would be justly compensated for their work. This
model would pull together billions of dollars to pay copyright holders,
and the system would also cut the high distribution costs many record
companies face.32 ° Overall, these new funds would recognize an
expansive range of copyright holders with fair rewards, which would
follow the intentions of copyright law by providing "economic incentive[s] for suppliers of creative expression.

'3 2 1

There are some negative

aspects of an NUL, however. First, to raise the funds necessary to
justly recompense artists, consumers may have to pay amounts that
are considered burdensome. 322 Administrative difficulties could feasibly arise in negotiations of the NUL, as well as in the proper distribution of the funds, since the system may be left vulnerable to artists
finding ways to overvalue their work.323 Also, it has been pointed out
that users not taking advantage of peer-to-peer technology would be
forced to pay for others who take full advantage of the networks, since
they would pay higher fees for the Internet access they intended to use
324
for other legal purposes.

Despite these shortcomings, Netanel offers a viable solution to the
problems currently facing the recording industry. The problems in his
316.
317.
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320.
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plan could be solved through implementing programs that would
charge larger percentages of the levy to those with faster Internet connections or through ISPs offering different service options that would
place the additional costs on those who wish to participate in file-sharing.3 25 Individuals who would be inconvenienced by the NUL could
pay lower prices to Internet service providers by guaranteeing that
they would not participate in file-sharing activities. 32 6 Some aspects of
the system are similar to the voluntary collective licensing system previously discussed, but the success of the NUL would not be based on the
participation of virtually all copyright holders. Netanel's NUL is also
a system that would simultaneously compensate copyright holders
and encourage innovation and technological advancement by embracing peer-to-peer technology and the potential it holds for fast and efficient communication. Certainly, many points of his proposal could be
incorporated into a new, efficient plan that would erase the need for
the costly campaign against music piracy currently underway.
3)

A Government-Run Rewards System

Professor William Fisher of Harvard University suggests that a
government rewards system, similar in many respects to Netanel's
NUL, would be the best possible solution to the problems facing the
music industry.3 2 7 Fisher's proposal is somewhat different than
Netanel's, as it emphasizes the government should play a major role in
the implementation of a new system to cure the problems of the current copyright regime. 328 Fisher advocates the government should
have some input in the creation of music and other entertainment,
since it is the responsibility of the U.S. government to work for the
good of the American people and to ensure there are incentives for
individuals to create in ways that are beneficial to society.329 He contends that the best solution is an administrative compensation system,
in which owners of copyrights would have the opportunity to register
their work with the U.S. Copyright Office. 3 30 Upon registering, they
would receive a unique identification code for their musical composition.3 3 The code would consist of numbers and letters, which could
later be used to track the activity of the file on peer-to-peer net325.
326.
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328.
329.
330.
331.

Id. at 73-74.
Id. at 72-73.
Fisher, supra note 234.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 4-5.
Id. at 3.

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol28/iss2/4

48

2006]

Morea: The Future of Music in a Digital Age: The Ongoing Conflict Betwee
THE FUTURE OF MUSIC IN A DIGITAL AGE

243

works.3 32 Similar to both voluntary collective licensing plans and
Netanel's NUL, consumers would be free to share as many files over
peer-to-peer networks as they desired and the RIAA's litigation campaign against file-sharers would cease. 333 In return, artists would be
compensated by receiving a portion of the pool of money the government would raise through taxes.3 3 4 Fisher's model would require several reforms to traditional U.S. copyright law, which would remove
rules that make file-sharing fall into the category of copyright infringement. Specifically, the copyright statute would need to undergo
changes and new provisions would be written to legalize the reproduction of music for noncommercial uses and the distribution of music
using peer-to-peer networks and Internet resources. 335 Overall, the
replacement of traditional copyright with a government-run rewards
system would mean that consumers would receive more value for less
money, that artists would receive a dependable paycheck on a consistent basis and the ability to have more control over the distribution of
their work, and that the industry in general could save a great deal of
money on transaction costs and legal bills.33 6
Fisher provides a great deal of complex details and calculations to
show that his plan would have many positive characteristics. In general, he suggests that copyright holders could easily register their work
over the Internet with the government, and the registration fees collected would be used to run the administrative portion of the system. 337 Next, the government would need to raise the funds necessary
to compensate these artists. 338 Fisher suggests that this should be
accomplished through taxes, similar to those suggested by Netanel.339
Two possible methods of introducing such taxes are an increase in
income taxes or a tax on the goods and services consumers must use
to access the wealth of material available on peer-to-peer networks.34 °
If the federal income tax was increased, the tax burden would be
spread amongst the eighty-seven million families who currently pay
income taxes in the United States. 341 This would result in a small estimated increase of twenty-seven dollars per household within the first
332.
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year the system was in place, in return for unhindered peer-to-peer
exchanges. 34 2 An increase in income taxes would be the most efficient, because it would also offer low administrative CoStS. 3 43 But
since it would be difficult to surmount political obstacles to this
income tax increase, the government would likely be forced to use the
second method, which would follow Netanel's model. Placing taxes on
specific products would put the tax burden on the few who purchase
those products and services. 34 4 Consequently, a more significant
financial burden would be placed on each individual.3 4 5 However, the
burden would be slightly alleviated as peer-to-peer technology continued to prosper and more individuals purchased the devices necessary
to take full advantage of legal downloading. 346 This method is also the
most expensive from an administrative standpoint.3 4 7 Despite the
problems with this tax, it would be the best way to raise the necessary
funds until a time when an increase in income taxes would be more
politically possible. The key factor is to set the tax at the correct
amount, since statistical analysis has shown that in a government
reward system for intellectual property, if the proper reward is not provided, the result is inadequate incentives for innovation. 34 8
After these funds were pulled together by the government, they
would be dispersed to artists based primarily on the consumer
demand for each work.3 49 The value of each work would be determined similarly to the way that Netanel's NUL addresses the issue.3 50
Fisher specifically suggests tracking the popularity of each musical
composition using sampling methods and other techniques now utilized by those researching television networks and ratings. 35 1 The
problem with these techniques is they leave the system open to the
same manipulations present under the previously discussed systems,
including the fact that artists could find ways to falsely increase the
342. Id. at 17.
343. Id. at 16.
344. Id. at 17.
345. Id. at 21.
346. Id. at 45.
347. Id. at 21-22.
348. See Steven Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards versus Intellectual Property
Rights, 22J.L. & ECON. 525 (2001). See generallyJohn Tehranian, All Rights Reserved?
Reassessing Copyright and Patent Enforcement in the Digital Age, 72 U. CIN. L. REv. 45,
75 (2003) (explaining the value of encouraging innovation and the role copyright law
and the government play in that endeavor).
349. Fisher, supra note 234, at 23.
350. Id. at 14.
351. Id. at 25.
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value of their own work by setting up computers to constantly
3 52
download their music.
Fisher's proposal for a government solution has both advantages
and disadvantages. Similar to Netanel's NUL, the system would benefit society not only by encouraging new technology, but also by reducing widespread infringement of copyright law. Massive numbers of
people willingly and knowingly violating the law is "culturally
unhealthy" and should not be allowed to continue.3 5 3 The rewards system would also prove to be more convenient for consumers and would
open more room for creativity and innovation.3 5 4 In the case of artists,
the rewards system would compensate them for the losses they have
sustained from infringement under the current copyright regime.3 5 5
The system in general would also encourage more sales of technological devices, which would in turn boost the U.S. economy.3 5 6 On a
negative note, it would be difficult to control the piracy of American
work outside the United States and the same difficulties facing
Netanel's NUL would most likely apply.3 5 7 Overall, Fisher's government-run rewards system offers valuable ideas that could be incorporated into a new system to solve the problems facing the recording
industry.
4)

Conclusions on Alternative Compensation Systems

All of the solutions presented above share one clear similarity - the
desire to allow and even encourage the use of peer-to-peer technology.
Through various means, they all propose ways to embrace technology,
while fairly compensating copyright holders by raising money that can
be distributed to those whose works are shared over the Internet. This
idea is built from the concept of a compulsory license, which is not a
foreign idea to U.S. copyright law. Traditionally, compulsory licenses
have played an important role in various situations, including when an
artist wishes to perform the work of another artist. Under U.S. law,
once a song has been released to the public, any individual can record
that song, if he or she pays a fee to the original copyright holder.3 58
This idea could, in theory, be extended to the activity taking place on
352. Id.
353. Id. at 39.
354. Id. at 41.
355. Id. at 8.
356. Id. at 41.
357. Id.
358. See Sj. Liebowitz, Alternative Copyright Systems: The Problems with a
Compulsory License 3, http://www.utdallas.edu/-liebowit/intprop/complpff.pdf.
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peer-to-peer networks. Although a voluntary collective licensing system could be the easiest solution, it would be difficult to involve nearly
all copright holders in the system. A plan that resembles the suggestions of Netanel or Fisher would most likely be more appropriate.
Without any doubt, research indicates that some form of an alternate
compensation system would be an efficient, positive solution to the
current problems of what can be considered the "increasingly creaky
copyright regime" that is outlined by U.S. law.3 5 9 Traditional copyright law would not need to be replaced entirely, although a system
could be put into practice that would protect consumers from the litigation of the RIAA.
As a valuable source for formulating an alternative, academics
have also analyzed private copying levies that have been used in many
countries, including to some degree the United States. In many countries, it is common for people to freely make copies of works for noncommercial purposes, after paying small taxes on devices that
facilitate copying.3 6 ° As one specific example, the law in Germany
does not hold individuals who make copies for personal use liable for
infringement, since a levy is placed on the sale of all equipment that is
used for copying or recording. 3 6 1 This is a simple idea that certainly
could be applied to the current problems the recording industry is facing in their attempts to strictly enforce U.S. copyright laws in order to
salvage their business.
The United States did take a stab at this concept in 1992, with the
enactment of the Audio Home Recording Act. 3 6 2 When enacted, it was
viewed as a "historic compromise between the consumer electronics
and music industries. '3 63 The act was intended to protect the use of
new recording technologies. It provided that claims could not be
brought against individuals who utilized digital recording technology
3 64 In addition, it required U.S. manufacturers of prodto copy music.
ucts primarily intended to make recordings to pay a tax of two percent
of the price of digital audio recording devices and three percent of the
price for digital audio recording media, subject to certain restrictions
and limitations, in order to raise the money necessary to compensate
359. See Fisher, supra note 246, at 14.
360. See Netanel, supra note 253, at 32.
361. Id.
362. Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (2000).
363. See Home Recording Rights Coalition, HRRC's Summary of the Audio Home
Recording Act, http://www.andrew.cmu.edu/course/19-102/ahrasumtxt (last visited
Feb. 23, 2006).
364. 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2000).
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copyright holders.3 6 5 The payments were to be collected and then
divided among artists, record companies, songwriters and music publishers, all of whom were required to file claims with the Librarian of
Congress in order to be eligible to collect their share.36 6 The ideas
underlying the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 (AHRA) are clearly
similar to those upon which the proposals of academics such as
Netanel and Fisher are based. Ultimately the AHRA can be deemed
useless today since a strong market for these devices did not fully
develop because newer, more efficient technology came into play.
Also, the AHRA itself cannot be applied in our current situation, since
it only addresses music, rather than the various types of files traded on
peer-to-peer networks, and it would not place taxes on devices, such as
computers, that are essential in file-sharing but have many other uses
outside of solely making copies.
The research presented in this article suggests that it would be in
the best interest of the recording industry to support and implement a
plan that includes ideas from the three models previously discussed.
The government could enact legislation that would expand the ideas of
the AHRA to apply to peer-to-peer technology. Such legislation would
be favorable for all parties, as it would promote the efficient consumerto-consumer methods of exchanging creative material and provide
financial benefits for copyright owners. Successful legislation to curb
the problems of music piracy should place taxes on ISPs and products
that are enhanced by peer-to-peer file sharing. Legislation would also
need to outline fair ways to set the level of the tax based on conditions
in the marketplace while fluctuating with the market to accommodate
the introduction of other new technology in the future.
All funds raised through these taxes should then be fairly collected and distributed among artists, depending on the value of their
specific exchanged work. This value could be determined by tracking
the total number of times any specific file is downloaded, as well as
how often it is later used. The value could be determined in the ways
outlined by other proposals to this point, such as those of Fisher and
Netanel. 36 7 Additionally, when handing out proceeds it may be advantageous to consider distributing a portion directly to artists, rather
than paying large record companies that typically control the rights. If
this was incorporated into a new system, artists may receive more
365. 17 U.S.C. § 1003 (2000).
366. 17 U.S.C. § 1005 (2000).
367. See Kasunic, supra note 73 (providing a brief comparison of the ideas of
William Fisher's approach and Neil Netanel's NUL).

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2006

53

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 4
248

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:195

direct compensation than they typically have in the past, and this practice could promote further creations by talented musicians.3 6
Not all experts have agreed, however, that a system similar to
those discussed above would be more beneficial than not. For
instance, Professor Stan Liebowitz suggests, "It is unlikely that a compulsory license would meet even the modest goals of a net positive
impact, to say nothing of the claims of virtual perfection that have
been attributed to it. '' 3 6 9 He contends that it should be turned to as an
absolute last resort.3 70 Several possible inefficiencies could come to
the forefront upon the implementation of a levy or tax system, and
these concerns would need to be fully addressed. First, raising the
pool of money necessary may be unfair to some consumers, since the
tax would be placed on a wide range of products that could be used for
a variety of purposes. For example, a blank CD could be used for
many different types of files, and computer hardware could certainly
be used for purposes other than file-sharing. If manufacturers of these
products were forced to pay a fee to compensate copyright holders,
some customers would then pay more for products without benefiting
from the ability to participate in protected file-sharing. Next, tracking
the frequency of downloads might cause concern, since artists could
find ways to manipulate the data at a moderately low cost and not
every download may actually be completed or of any value to the
user.

371

Regardless of these faults, it seems that a method of raising money
through taxing those who facilitate file-sharing and then dispersing
that money to copyright holders would be the next logical and highly
beneficial step for the recording industry. It is also a clearly superior
option to costly, apparently endless rounds of lawsuits and criminal
prosecutions for a large number of Americans.
CONCLUSION

When walking through the crowded streets of New York City, one
cannot help but notice the common sight of small, white iPod headphones, as the individuals rushing by are most likely listening to their
newest MP3s. As technology is changing constantly, what will the
future of the music industry hold if steps are not taken to embrace the
potential the Internet and technology can offer? As seen from the
incredible increases in Apple's sales of iPods during the last year, there
368. See Netanel, supra note 253, at 58.
369. Liebowitz, supra note 358, at 3.
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is no doubt that consumers are embracing digital music, and many are
exploring the large number of benefits that the new technology
offers.3 7 2 As a result of MP3s and new technological devices that have
been recently introduced, it is now possible for an average American
consumer to carry thousands of his or her favorite songs in a small
pocket, without ever having to change CDs or audio tapes. It would
surely harm society to hold back progress or to make criminals out of
individuals who want to fully appreciate modern innovation. By fighting the introduction of new technology, such as peer-to-peer networks,
the music industry is building obstacles to the development of more
innovative ideas, such as those introduced by Apple and other manufacturers of MP3 players and similar technological devices.
According to the EFF, "[Tihe current battles surrounding peer-topeer file sharing are a losing proposition for everyone.' 373 The RIAA's
campaign against music piracy is clearly causing more damage than
good, since it seeks to shut down the widespread use of peer-to-peer
technology that has the enormous promise of acting as a new stage for
creativity and speech. The enactment of more penalties for copyright
infringement over peer-to-peer networks will only hinder activity that
could benefit society if controlled appropriately. According to Neil
Netanel, "[Pleople who might previously have been passive consumers
now assert a more active, self-defining role in the enjoyment, use and
creation of cultural expression. '374 This is exactly the type of activity
that is encouraged by peer-to-peer technology, and the research
presented throughout this article clearly supports that it is simply too
difficult to enforce traditional U.S. copyright law in today's technologydriven environment. The law should change and mature with society.
As a result, a new system of compensating artists while allowing unobstructed file sharing should be implemented. Through embracing what
the future has to offer and enjoying the technology that has been introduced today, the music industry and recording artists could continue
to grow and thrive for many years to come in a world of digital music.
372. See generally Larry Angell, Apple Reports Record Earnings as iPod Sales Soar

()an. 12, 2005), http://www.ilounge.com/index.php/news/comments/apple-reportsrecord-earnings-as-ipod-sales-soar/. Apple reported that it sold more than 4,580,000
iPods during the first quarter of fiscal year 2005, representing a 525% increase in iPod
units compared to this time the year prior. Total sales of all iPod models brought in
more than $1.2 billion in revenue for Apple during the quarter. Apple's music

division, which includes the iTunes Music Store and iPod services and accessories,
accounted for $177 million of the first quarter's revenue, a 277% increase year-overyear. Id.
373. See EFF, supra note 279, at 1.
374. See Netanel, supra note 253, at 3.
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